The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress by Tien, Hung-mao
NUMBER 2- 1984 (81) 
NUMBER 2 - 1984 (81) 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: 
PARTY POWERS AND GROUP POUTICS 
FROM THE THIRD PLENUM TO THE 
TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS 
Hung-mao Tien 
School of LAw 
~ 
of 
MAaylANCI • 
' 
• I 
I 
\ 
1 
' 
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
General Editor: Hungdah Chiu 
Executive Editor: Mitchell A. Silk 
Managing Editor: Shirley Lay 
Editorial Advisory Board 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California 
at Berkeley 
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University 
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University 
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia 
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, Lafayette College 
Professor James Hsiung, New York University 
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the 
Republic of China 
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University 
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan 
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International 
Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany 
Professor Choon-ho Park, College of Law and East Asian Law of 
the Sea Institute, Korea University, Republic of Korea 
Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society 
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law, 
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA. 
All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors. 
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, 
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion 
contained therein. 
Subscription is US $10.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in 
the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to 
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu. 
Price for single copy of this issue: US $3.00 
© 1984 by Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. 
ISSN 0730-0107 
ISBN 0-942182-61-8 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: PARTY POWERS 
AND GROUP POLITICS FROM THE THIRD PLENUM 
TO THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS 
Hung-mao Tien * 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. Introduction................................. . . . . . . . . . . 3 
II. Group Politics since the Third Plenum................ 7 
Events Prior to the Third Plenum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
The Third Plenum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Major Party Decisions between the Third Plenum and 
the Twelfth Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Central Work Conference, April 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
The Fourth Plenum, September 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
The Fifth Plenum, February 1980................... 17 
Central Work Conference, December 1980. . . . . . . . . . 17 
The Sixth Plenum, June 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
III. The Twelfth Party Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
The Central Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
The Politburo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Central Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
IV. Military Leaders in the Party. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
V. Functional System of the Power Elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
VI. The Essence of Group Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
VII. Party Rebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
VIII. The System in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
TABLES 
Table A Survival Rate of Politburo and Central Committee 
Members.......................................... 21 
Table B Politburo Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
----------
• Hung-mao Tien is a professor and chairman of the Political Science Department, 
University of Wisconsin Center System. He is also program faculty of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison Land Tenure Center. Author of Politics and Government in Kuomin-
tang China (Stanford), he has recently edited Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy. 
He is currently working on a book project, Politics of Taiwan s Modernization (Republic of 
China), to be published as a part of Hoover Institution series on The Modernization of 
the Two Chinese States. 
( 1) 
2 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Table C Central Secretariat Members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Table D Military Representation in Party Posts. . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
APPENDICES 
(with Chinese characters) 
Members and Alternate Members of the Political Bureau ofthe Cen-
tral Committee 
Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee 
General Secretary of the Central Committee 
Members and Alternate Members of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the 
Central Committee 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission 
Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: PARTY POWERS 
AND GROUP POLITICS FROM THE THIRD PLENUM 
TO THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS 
Hung-mao Tien * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
3 
In recent years, more China scholars have looked to factions in 
analyzing the elites, the national policy-making, and the overall pat-
tern of Chinese political behavior. The sudden spurt of interest in 
Chinese political groups has been in part influenced by the excellent 
pioneer works of William Whitson and Andrew J. Nathan.• Polit-
ical events in China since the 1960s have also brought about growing 
awareness that group analysis can indeed broaden our knowledge of 
China's complex political process. During the Cultural Revolution 
of 1966-1976, party institutions were in virtual paralysis, while over-
all institutionalized policy-making and implementation processes 
were eclipsed in a state of dysfunction or even chaos. Politics involv-
ing the succession to Mao Zedong induced various political groups 
to juggle for power in an apparent effort to protect their stakes in the 
outcome. 
A survey of recent scholarly writings reveals widespread ac-
knowledgement of the existence of political groups. These writings 
cover the period from approximately 1969 (the 9th party congress) to 
1981, and vary in reference to time span and arenas of politics and 
policy classification. The following summaries represent a spectrum 
of existing scholarly classifications of political groups in China: 
Authors 
Michael Oksenberg2 
Category of Groups 
Military fundamentalists: Qi 
Benyu, Guan Feng 
Radical conservatives: Mao 
Zedong 
Eclectic modernizers: Zhou 
Political 
or Policy Arena 
Foreign policy 
--------~ --~ 
• I want to thank Professors Michel Oksenberg, Ramon Myers, and Pi-chao Chen 
for their valuable comments on the draft of this article. 
I. William Whitson with Huang Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History 
of Chinese Military Politics, New York: Praeger, 1973: Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factional-
ism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January-March 1973), pp. 
34-66. 
2. Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," 
ProblemsofCommunism, Vol. 23, No.3 (March/Aprill974), pp. 2-12. 
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Enlai, Deng Xiaoping 
Westernized Chinese: (few 
in hiding) 
Ken Lieberthal3 - I Peking group: Zhou, Li 
Xiannian 
Shanghai group: Zhang, Yao 
Wenyuan, et al. 
Military group: PLA 
commanders, Chen Xilian 
II Westernizers: Zhou, Deng 
Eclectics: Mao, Hua 
Radicals: "Gang of Four" 
Ting Wang4 Bureaucratic clique: Li, Yu 
Qiuli 
Jiang Qing clique 
Harry Harding5 Military faction: Lin Biao, 
Fourth Field Army 
Moderate faction: Zhou, 
Deng 
Lucian Pye6 
Tony Saich7 
Dorothy J. Solinger8 
Leftist faction: Zhang 
Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, et al. 
Whatever faction: Hua 
Guofeng, et al. 
Opposition faction: Y e 
Jianying 
Restoration faction: Deng, 
Hu Yaobang 
Practice faction: Deng, Hu 
Whatever faction: Hua, 
Wang Dongxing 
Adjusters: Chen Yun, Yao 
Yilin 
Reformers: Zhao Ziyang, 
National powers 
Modernization 
and succession 
National political 
powers 
Overall national 
program 
Evaluation of 
Mao and Maoism 
Economic moderni-
zation 
3. Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Internal Political Scene," Problems o.f Communism, 
Vol. 24, No. 3 (May/June 1975), pp. 5-6; and also "Modernization and Succession 
Politics in China," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 239-240. 
4. Ting Wang, "Trends in China: Leadership Realignment," Problems if 
Communism, Vol. 26, No.4 (July/August 1977), p. 3. 
5. Harry Harding, Organizing China, The Problem o/ Bureaucracy /949-1976, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1981, pp. 298-323. 
6. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics, Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, 
Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc. 1981, pp. 13-25. 
7. Tony Saich, China: Politics and Government, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, 
p. 65. 
8. Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of 
Wang Shu-shin9 
Dorothy Grouse 
Fontana 10 
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Wan Li 
Conservers: Yu, Kang Shien 
Reformists: Deng 
Conservatives: Ye 
Leftists: Hua 
Petroleum faction: Li, Yu 
Economic adjustment 
faction: Chen Yun 
Whateverists: Hua 
Dengists: Zhao, Chen, Deng 
Petroleum: Yu 
Power alignment 
and policy 
differences 
Power alignment 
Southern military-provincial coalition: Wei 
Guoqing, Xu Shiyou 
5 
A number of these writings (e.g., Oksenberg, Saich, Lieberthal, Sol-
inger) specify the particular political or policy arena of their catego-
rization of groups, while others speak more generally. Some writers, 
like Harding and Lieberthal, confine their references to the period 
which begins prior to the death of Mao and concludes with the sub-
sequent arrest of the Gang of Four in the fall of 1976. Most writers 
deal with the 1970s, particularly the years since 1977. 
The adoption of group labels, as evident above, attests to the 
lack of uniformity in group categorization. Thus, several key polit-
ical actors have been placed in apparently contradictory groupings. 
For instance, Lieberthal refers to Mao and Hua as eclectics, and 
Zhou and Deng are classified as westernizers. Oksenberg, on the 
other hand, describes Zhou and Deng as eclectic modernizers, but 
depicts westernized Chinese as "few and hiding." Fontana associ-
ates Zhao and Chen Yun with Deng, while Solinger assigns Chen 
and Zhao to different groupings. Part of the reason for such schol-
arly inconsistency may be explained by the fact that data on infor-
mal groups is meager and extremely unreliable. As John Bryan 
Starr asserts, "Since personal relations are, almost by definition, not 
open to public scrutiny, the identification of cliques and their mem-
berships becomes particularly problematic."'' In addition to the 
problems in identifying group membership as well as in delineating 
Policymaking: Reform, Readjustment and the Opposition, Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 
12 (December 1982), pp. 1242-1245. 
9. Shu-shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party," Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 9 (September 1982), p. 817. 
10. Dorothy Crouse Fontana, "Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng," Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 240-249. 
II. John Bryan Starr, "From the lOth Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua 
6 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
their functional boundaries and institutional bases, the scholarly 
community remains unable to identify membership of Chinese polit-
ical groups beyond a handful of individuals active on the national 
level. 
What causes the formation of political groups, in both national 
and local scenes, remains an unsettled issue. Before reliable empiri-
cal data become more available, any attempt to theorize about Chi-
nese group phenomena would remain hypothetical at best. In all 
likelihood, a multiplicity of factors (i.e., the perspectives of policy 
orientation, cultural characteristics, informal social relationships, in-
stitutional affiliation, territorial affinity and perceived self-interest) 
will probably continue to determine the formation of groups. One 
could also argue that the dominance of group behaviors in recent 
Chinese politics simply reflects the state of China's political develop-
ment at a time when the institutionalization of political life remains 
infantile, subject to the impacts of cyclically volatile political cur-
rents. Pye's ambitious theory that asserts factionalism is a manifes-
tation of Chinese psycho-cultural behaviors, and that bureaucratic 
interests are less likely in China than in most places with different 
political systems to become "pivotal points of political conflicts and 
alliances" is insightful heuristically; however, its validity in explain-
ing the pecularity of Chinese political style has not been fully 
tested. 12 
In spite of the difficulties of precisely identifying membership in 
various political groups, adopting a group approach to the analysis 
of Chinese political events during the period from the 11th Central 
Committee (CC) Third Plenum (December 1978) to the 12th Party 
Congress (September 1982) remains useful. As subsequent discus-
sion will reveal, conflicts between political groups in ideology, pol-
icy, and power bases are characteristic of China's elite politics during 
that period. 
The Third Plenum is now officially proclaimed to be the turning 
point of the post-Mao Zedong era, characterized by the emergence 
of a new leadership committed to a course of development funda-
mentaUy different from the past. 13 Given all of the sequence of 
Kuo-feng: The Significance of the Colour of the Cat," The China Quarterly, No. 67 
(September 1976), p. 480. 
12. Pye, supra note 6, p. 82. 
13. Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush's recent study also describes it as the "cru-
cial watershed of the Post-Mao era." See Oksenberg and Bush, "China's Political Evolu-
tion: 1972-1982," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI, No.5 (August/September 1982), 
p. 8. 
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events that followed, the PRC's official claim is well founded. In 
retrospect the years since mid-1978 have indeed witnessed the steady 
rise of a powerful elite group surrounding Deng Xiaoping, Chen 
Yun, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, at the expense of those associ-
ated with Maosim, the Gang of Four, and Lin Biao. The process of 
power transfer began in the Third Plenum and was practically com-
pleted by the time the 12th Party Congress was held. 
This essay seeks to analyze: 1) the evolution of the new power 
alignment evident since the Third Plenum; 2) the network of power 
bases of this leadership group; 3) the strategy adopted in the appar-
ent struggle for powers between these newly emerged power elites 
and their opponents; and 4) changes in policy and institutions, par-
ticularly in the Party, that were part of the struggle and that helped 
shape the sequence of developments in the PRC's political system. It 
should be pointed out that events since 1978 had their twists and 
turns: there were occasional setbacks for the finally dominant 
Dengist group. Even today there remain questions concerning the 
extent to which this group can control China's political situation 
without encountering further political turmoil ahead. However, the 
general pattern of political development in the last five years 
strongly suggests that Deng's principal opponents will have little 
chance of altering the r.urrent power alignment and policy direction 
in the foreseeable future. 
Group Politics Since the Third Plenum 
The Deng-Hu group had virtually dominated the centers of 
PRC's national power by the time the 12th Party Congress was held 
in September 1982. They controlled the gateways to the arenas of 
power in the Party, the government, and the military. The process 
by which they acquired such power can be clarified by tracing the 
sequence of political t=vents since the 11th CC's Third Plenum. 
The 11th CC held seven plenary sessions. Several Central 
Work Conferences were also convened. The Third Plenum and the 
Central Work Conference preceding it-both held in December 
1978-were the critical meetings most responsible for altering direc-
tion of CCP line, institutional development, and leadership changes. 
In addition, the Fourth Plenum (September 1979), Fifth Plenum 
(February 1980), Sixth Plenum (June 1981) and the Central Work 
Conferences in April 1979, December 1980, an December 1981, also 
brought about important decisions and changes that elaborated, en-
riched, modified, or implemented the emerging new line. The ulti-
mate result was a wholesale change of leaders and policy line as well 
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as adoption of the new Party Constitution at the 12th Party Con-
gress. In line with the sequence of these political developments a 
new PRC constitution was adopted on December 4, 1982 by the 
Fifth National People's Congress. 
Events Prior to the Third Plenum 
The Third Plenum of the 11th CC was the turning point for the 
reemerging political fortunes of Deng, Hu, Chen Yun, ~nd their re-
habilitated cadres. The CC officially made the decisions to endorse 
their views, thus strengthening their formal authority. To para-
phrase Lowell Dittmar's words, the informal network of Deng's 
political base was translated more effectively into positions of formal 
power. 14 But it would be wrong to assume that the Third Plenum 
decisions were reached in an atmosphere of a free-for-all democratic 
contest; nor should one assume that the plenary session resembled 
anything like a great parliamentary debate. On the contrary, deci-
sions might have been made almost in their entirety in the Central 
Work Conference prior to the plenum session. 
For two years before the conference and plenum were held, the 
central leadership had been preoccupied with the issues of the Gang 
of Four and the implementation of the earlier version of the Four 
Modernizations initiated by Zhou Enlai and later enunciated by 
Hua Guofeng. Those who were responsible for the arrest of the 
Gang of Four and their proteges were anxious to reconstruct a na-
tional leadership surrounding Hua, Ye, and Li Xiannian. Differ-
ences on policy matters and power considerations among them and 
those already rehabilitated did not surface to become politically divi-
sive. Their common denominator lay in concerted efforts against the 
Gang of Four forces and radical policies. However, by 1977, 77 
members of the CC, presumably the Gang's radical followers, were 
purged or suspended. 15 
The situation began to change once Deng was rehabilitated for 
the second time in the spring of 1977. 16 Deng's rehabilitation was 
14. Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of power in Chinese politics: A Theory and An Analysis 
of the Fall of 'Gang of Four' " World Politics, Vol. XXXI, No. I (October 1978), pp. 28-
33. 
15. Fifty-one of them belonged to the worker-peasant backgrounds, while fourteen 
were described as civilian cadres and twelve as PLA officers. See Fontana, supra note 10, 
p. 249. 
16. Kenneth Lieberthal argues that Hua and Deng struck a deal in writing, according 
to which Deng admitted personal errors and promised to support Hua as the national 
leader. See his "Modernization and Succession Politics in China," supra note 3, p. 246. 
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subsequently made official at the Third Plenum of the lOth CC in 
July that year. Several of Deng's close associates who had been 
purged with him for the second time following the 1976 Tienanmen 
Incident also reappeared. They included, for example, Hu Yaobang, 
Hu Qiaomu and Xi Zhongxun. Immediately upon their return to 
active political life, they began to rebuild political bases. Their ag-
gressive efforts soon yielded results. The initial targets were to con-
trol the Party center while simultaneously nurturing support in the 
provinces to undermine the institutional and territorial bases of Hua, 
Wang Dongxing, and others. The process of competition for pivotal 
offices can be described simply as a power struggle. 
Deng may have been consulted in Hua's preparation for the 
"Draft Outline of the Ten Year Plan for the National Economy," 
which the then Premier Hua officially presented to the First Session 
of the Fifth NPC (Feb. 26-March 5) in 1978. But his principal con-
cerns at this time did not involve economic policy issues. He ap-
peared to be more preoccupied with penetrating the ranks of the 
PLA (he was Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the Mili-
tary Commission), controlling the Party center, manipulating the 
change of leaders in the provinces and military regions, and prepar-
ing an ideological rationale for launching his political and policy of-
fensives. In short, he and his associates focused on building bases 
for expanding their political powers. 
Upon rehabilitation, Hu Yaobang immediately turned his atten-
tion to capturing the Party's bureaucratic headquarters, the most im-
portant of which were the CC's General Office (Zhongyang 
bangongting), the Organization Department, and the Propaganda 
Department. Control of these Party units would be a critical step 
toward a faster rehabilitation of the purged cadres, who would be 
likely supporters. Such steps would subsequently facilitate the re-
turn of Deng-Hu's friends and followers to important Party posts in 
the provinces and municipalities. They would then be able to shape 
the direction of Party-controlled public communications. If the re-
habilitated cadres could be placed in influential positions in the cit-
ies, the provinces, and the various production and services units, 
they would inevitably join the Deng force to form a network of sup-
port for Deng's leadership and policy lines. The Party's central bu-
reaucratic offices were thus crucial instruments needed for the 
capture and restoration of the Party powers. 
But these Party units were closely guarded by Hua and Wang 
Dongxing. Since the Central Secretariat was abolished during the 
Cultural Revolution, the CC General Office had taken over many of 
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the Secretariat functions. Wang Dongxing had been hand-picked by 
Mao to replace Yang Shangkun as the office director. In 1969 when 
the Ninth Party Congress did away with the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group, the General Office's authority expanded. It con-
trolled sensitive personnel archives and handled confidential com-
munications and high-level documentsY Under Wang's control the 
office established three sections to review cases of high-level officials 
in the Party, government, and PLA who had been purged. 18 As sub-
sequent events have revealed, they blocked the rehabilitation of 
many purged cadres. 
The initial penetration into the office came when Hu Yaobang 
was appointed Deputy Director of the General Office at the Tenth 
CC's Third Plenum, serving ostensibly under Wang Dongxing. In 
October 1977 he replaced the radical Guo Yufeng to become Head 
of Organization Department. Acting in that capacity, Hu reportedly 
corrected many "erroneous cases" and recommended the rehabilita-
tion of the "victims." Major rehabilitation cases announced at the 
11th CC's Third Plenum may have been handled by him. Hu's later 
appointment in December that year as Vice-President of the Central 
Party School (Hua was President and Wang the First Vice-President) 
also put him in an apparent collision course with Hua and Wang. In 
spite of such initial efforts, the Hua-Wang force retained the upper 
hand in the balance of powers in these units. The Propaganda De-
partment was still headed by Zhang Pinghua, a Hua protege who 
had previously served as the First Party Secretary of Hunan. Deng's 
man Zhu Muzhi was brought in as a number two to counter Zhang's 
authority. As the battle line in group rivalries was being drawn in 
the Party's bureaucratic headquarters, Hu Qiaomu took over the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1978. He revitalized that 
institution and used it as a base to develop economic theories and to 
train cadres specialized in them. From the Academy he prepared, 
for Deng's use, some important ideological documents and theories 
on socialist economy which were to become immensely important 
later on. In July 1978 he published the important essay, "Act in Ac-
cordance with Economic Laws, Step Up the Four Modernizations," 
in which he proposed market socialism in order to expand economic 
productive capacity at a higher level of efficiency and productivity. 19 
17. Shu-shin Wang, supra note 9, p. 807. 
18. Luo Bing, "Fanshipai shi shi ji" (An account of the Whateverist Faction's loss of 
power base), Zheng Ming, No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8. 
19. A. Doak Barnett, China's Economy in Global Perspective, Washinton, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 37. 
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The essay had immediate impact on the Third Plenum when the is-
sues related to socialist modernization were being discussed. 
Taking advantage of the growing number of rehabilitated vic-
tims of the Cultural Revolution, the Deng-Hu group quickly 
manipulated their appointments to the provincial and local leader-
ship positions. By 1979, Guangdong alone witnessed the return of 
over 40,000 such people to basic level cadre positions.20 Initially 
many were reinstalled in the revolutionary committees, schools, and 
enterprises. Gradually they stepped into the more pivotal positions 
in the Party. In 1978 their impact began to reach many provincial 
and municipal level Party Committees. During 1977-78, provincial 
Party committees reportedly had been reorganized in Guangdong, 
Shanxi, Henan, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Ningxia, Liaoning, 
Hunan, Hubei, Tibet, Guangxi, Guizhou, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Beijing.21 Changes of military commanders and political commis-
sars also took place in several regions and districts. Thus by the time 
the Central Work Conference was convened in late 1978, supporters 
of Deng and Hu had controlled or formed a formidable power bloc 
in at least half of China's military regions, military districts, provin-
cial and municipal revolutionary committees, and Party committees, 
severely undermining the power bases of the central political force 
centered around Hua, Ye and Li. They were clearly on the verge of 
crippling whatever powers were left in the hands of the previous sup-
porters of the Gang of Four. Deng's proteges were rapidly consoli-
dating Party and/or military powers in the critical locations of 
Guangdong (Xi Zhongxun), Hubei (Chen Pixian), Henan (Duan 
Junyi), Shanghai (Su Zhenhua, Peng Chong), Beijing (Qin Jiwei), 
Tianjin (Chen Weida), Shaanxi (Ma Wenrui), Sichuan (Zhao 
Ziyang) and Liaoning (Ren Zhongyi). When leading cadres of the 
Party, PLA, and government headquarters, and of the military re-
gions, provinces and municipalities were all summoned for the work 
conference, it did not come as a surprise that majority sentiments 
leaned toward the support of emerging powerful political force cen-
tered around the personality of Deng Xiaoping. 
THE THIRD PLENUM 
At the Third Plenum (December 18-23, 1978) Hua Guofeng 
20. Fontana, supra note 10, p. 249. 
21. Zhonggong Nianbao (Yearbook in Chinese Communism), Taipei: Zhonggong 
Yanjiu Zazhishe, 1979, pp. II 2-4; also Lieberthal, "Modernization and Succession ... " 
supra note 3, p. 253. 
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presented a Politburo decision to stop the on-going mass campaigns 
against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and to shift the Party and 
national focus on the modernization plan. It was duly endorsed in 
the opening minutes of the session. He urged the Party to stress from 
then on the notion of collective leadership and put less emphasis on 
the individual cult. This was probably a response to the rumored 
criticism directed against him in the preceding work conference. 
The plenum discussed the importance of implementing Mao's more 
conservative speeches-"On the Ten Major Relations," "On the 
Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," and "The 
60-Point Method ofWork"-which had been sidetracked since 1958 
in favor of the Chairman's more radical directives. These three doc-
uments were to become the segment of Mao Zedong Thought which 
the Deng-Hu group would be willing to live with. 
The plenum accomplished three important tasks.22 It elected 
members to the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central 
Commission for Inspecting Discipline. It approved a number of pol-
icy decisions and set forth the new ideological tone desired by the 
Deng-Hu group. It reversed verdicts on most of the Party's impor-
tant political cases since the Great Leap Forward. All of these deci-
sions have had profound consequences in regard to the political 
development that followed. They realigned the central and later, 
provincial-regional power distribution, shifted the direction of party 
lines, and laid the policy foundation for institutional changes. Out-
comes of the plenum are spelled out as follows: 
A. Elections: Four important allies of Deng-Chen Yun, 
Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen-were added to the 
Politburo. Chen Yun also joined its Standing Committee, and be-
came a Vice-Chairman of the Party. Nine rehabilitated cadres-
Huang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang 
Renzhong, Chen Zhaidao, Han Kuang, and Zhu Hui-became new 
members of the Central Committee. In the subsequent years, most 
of these people were to play crucial roles in expanding the power 
bases of Deng-Hu leadership. 
In addition, Hu Y aobang was appointed to the newly restored 
post of the CC Secretary General (bishuzhang)-the same title Deng 
held during 1954-56 prior to assuming the more powerful title of 
General Secretary (zong shuji) in 1956. Hu subsequently used that 
22. The following accounts are based on information provided in the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS). People's Republic of China, Dec. 
26, 1978, pp. El-E24, and December 27, 1978, pp. El-E20. 
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position to salvage the CC General Office from Wang Dongxing's 
control and to rebuild the Party central bureaucracy by reviving the 
Central Secretariat. As Secretary General he also directed the Party 
center's daily work, particularly in regard with personnel changes, 
quickened the pace of rehabilitating Cultural Revolution victims, 
and controlled the agenda of Party meetings. In retrospect, Deng 
clearly wanted Hu to be the pivotal man in rebuilding the Party ap-
paratus, and to use that as the principal political base to control 
Party powers. 
B. Party Lines and Policy Decisions: PRC leaders and media 
today have made frequent reference to the Third Plenum Lines, im-
plying that the Party lines advocated by Deng and others were offi-
cially put forward at the Third Plenum. Jurgen Domes defines 
"Line [in the PRC politics as] a set of basic policies in all major areas 
of political decision-making, i.e., a comprehensive platform devel-
oped on the basis of long-term strategies as well as intermediate 
range tactical considerations."23 He identifies the following five 
realms of line application: 1) ideological principles; 2) international 
politics; 3) economic development; 4) social development; 5) educa-
tion and culture. 24 The Third Plenum did not deal with all of these 
topics. On the most important question of ideological principles, 
there was no definitive resolution. Given the scanty evidence avail-
able, policy lines were discussed in the plenum, but only some areas 
of discussion resulted in concrete resolution. 
In the discussion of major political questions arising from PRC 
history, Deng apparently introduced the notion that these questions 
must be settled in accordance with the principle which Mao Zedong 
sometimes advocated, e.g., "Seeking Truth from Facts and Cor-
recting Mistakes Whenever Discovered."25 Statements by the CC 
afterward only went so far as to say that the plenum "puts a high 
evaluation on the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion 
for testing truth."26 The wordings suggest that this Dengist ideologi-
cal canon was not officially adopted in resolution form. Such an am-
biguous statement reveals the existence of substantial opposition in 
the plenum. 
23. Jurgen Domes, "1976-82: Evolution of a New CCP Line?" in Chang King-yuh 
(ed), The Emerging Teng System: Orientation, Po/ici.?s, and Implications, Vol. II, Taipei: 
Institute of International Relations, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
24. Ibtd. 
25. FBIS., December 26, supra note 22, pp. EIO. 
26. Ibid., p. Ell. 
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The session did adopt the "Regulations on the Work in the Ru-
ral People's Communes" in order to reform agricultural practice in 
the commune system and to increase production. It also discussed 
the draft copy of the document on "Some Questions Concerning the 
Acceleration of Agricultural Development." It approved higher 
purchase prices for grain and other agricultural produce. Prices in 
farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, insecticides, plastics, etc. were 
also reduced in order to cut down agricultural costs. The State 
Council was instructed to adopt an implementation plan according 
to these changes. It was decided that these two documents were to 
be forwarded to provinces and municipalities for study and imple-
mentation on trial basis. Questions with regard to raising agricul-
tural production seemed to involve a great deal of detailed 
discussion. 
C Reversal of verdicts in past political cases: Under the influ-
ence of Deng and Chen Yun, the plenum officially repudiated 
charges against the victims of many previous purges. In particular, it 
corrected the April 5, 1976 "Tiananmen Incidents," calling them 
"revolutionary actions." It referred to the cases involving Peng 
Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun as "erroneous con-
clusions." It called for rehabilitating victims of these "false charges" 
and "frame-ups." In spite of Hua's opening statement that mass 
campaigns against the Gang of Four be stopped, the session none-
theless endorsed thorough investigation of the individuals and inci-
dents associated with the Gang of Four "conspiracy to usurp Party 
and state powers.'m In short, the CC officially legitimized the reha-
bilitation policy put forward by the Deng-Chen group. The other 
major victims of Mao not mentioned in the statement were Liu 
Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Lu Dingyi. Liu's case was not settled until 
the Fifth Plenum in February 1980. Controversy within the high 
Party circle over the Liu case apparently was too profound to be 
settled at this time. 
But Peng Zhen was rehabilitated on December 23, the day after 
the plenum was ended. Many others including Lu Dingyi followed 
suit. Many rehabilitated cadres soon resumed important assign-
ments, strengthening political bases of Deng and his close associates 
at the Party center. Realignment of powers at the provincial level 
proceeded so rapidly that by 1980, twenty-five out of the twenty-nine 
provincial First Party Secretaries fell into the hands of rehabilitated 
27. Ibid., p. E9. 
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cadres. 28 Once those who previously suffered political disgrace 
staged their comeback behind the bandwagon of Deng-Hu power 
machine, the politics of revenge and restoration quickly took their 
toll against the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. 
In 1979, the power base of Wang Dongxing crumbled to pieces. 
Yao Yilin, a noted protege of Chen Yun replaced Wang as Director 
of the CC General Office. Feng Wenbin, a senior colleague of Hu 
Yaobang in the CYL during the early 1950s, became its Vice-Direc-
tor, effectively terminating control of the office by Wang and his pro-
teges, Li Xin and Zhang Yaochu.29 Hu Yaobang himself took over 
Zhang Pinghua's position as Head of the CC Propaganda Depart-
ment and immediately reshuffled the key positions at Hongqi (Red 
Flag). Meanwhile, Hu Qiaomu replaced Hua as Director of the 
Committee on Mao Zedong Work, a critical position which oversees 
the selection and evaluation of Mao's writings for party consump-
tion. The General Office's functions which dealt with personnel files 
of the purged senior cadres were turned over to the Organization 
Department. Wang Dongxing's "8341" Garrison Troop, responsible 
for the security of Zhongnanhai (where top leaders live and work), 
was put under the direct command of General Yang Dezhi, a Deng 
confident, in the headquarters of the PLA Chief of General Staff. 
These moves assured Deng-Hu's virtual control over the Party cen-
tral bureaucracy at the expense of Hua and Wang. The policy of 
rehabilitation and major personnel changes at the Third Plenum 
thus had profound implications for the rivalry of powers between 
Deng-Hu and Hua-Wang. 
MAJOR PARTY DECISIONS BETWEEN THE THIRD 
PLENUM AND THE TWELFTH PARTY 
CONGRESS 
In spite of the apparent political victories at the Third Plenum, 
the emerging leadership of Deng, Hu, Zhao, and Chen went through 
a series of twists and turns, subject to minor periodic setbacks be-
tween 1979 and 1981. Nonetheless, the overall political currents 
clearly moved in a direction that favored their leadership and policy 
positions. They did, however, meet challenges and resistance. 
Neither would one argue that internal policy differences did not exist 
within the Deng group. They did, and perhaps still do. But politics 
in those years were gradually cast in the form of Deng's group versus 
28. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1980, pp. 11-12. 
29. Luo Bing, supra note 18, p. 8. 
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those who prospered during the turbulent years 1966-76. The most 
salient character of such political tension existed between Deng's 
group and the "Whateverists" who subscribed to the doctrine, 
"Whatever policies Mao had made should be resolutely defended, 
whatever instructions Mao had given should be steadily abided 
by."30 Before we discuss this issue in further detail, let us first review 
the major events which transpired in the CC Plena and Central 
Work Conferences as follows: 
CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE-APRIL 1979 
The conference focused on problems derived from the ambi-
tious economic modernization packages put together by Hua, Li 
Xiannian, Yu Qiuli and other top economic planners associated with 
the "Petroleum Clique." It adopted the famous "Eight-Character" 
economic policy for the coming three years, that is, readjustment, 
reform, consolidation, and standards improvement. Among other 
actions, it also set forth the new guidelines to broaden the scope of 
autonomy for enterprise management, to permit retention of profits 
by enterprise units, to restrict the acquisition of new and large equip-
ment, to practice democratic and scientific management, and to es-
tablish responsibility systems for factory managers, chief engineers 
and administrative leaders. 
THE FOURTH PLENUM, SEPTEMBER 1979 
It discussed and endorsed a speech draft to be delivered by Y e 
Jianying on October 1 in commemoration of the PRC's Thirtieth 
Anniversary celebration. The highlight of the speech stressed the 
theme that without Mao Zedong Thought there would have been no 
new China; but Maoist thought was not a product of Mao's personal 
wisdom alone, rather that of the CCP's collective wisdom.31 It was 
an apparent effort to de-apothesize Mao and Maoism. 
In addition, it formally adopted the "Decisions on Some Ques-
tions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development," 
first discussed in the Third Plenum. It ·added twelve rehabilitated 
leaders to the CC roster. They included Yang Shangkun, Peng 
Zhen, Bo Yibo, Zhou Yang, Lu Dingyi, Jiang Nanxiang. Wang 
30. This position was first articulated in publication by the Commentator of Renmin 
Ribao, February 7, 1977, p. I. The daily paper's editorial staff was under the control of 
Wang Dongxing at that time. 
31. Renmin Ribao, October 2, 1979, p. I. 
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Dongxing reportedly was compelled to make a self-criticism, a clear 
signal of the decline of his political influence. 
THE FIFTH PLENUM, FEBRUARY 1980 
This was an enlarged session, attended also by scores of second 
echelon leaders who were not CC members. The session lasted for 
one week, an unusual length for a plenum. It discussed the draft of 
the proposed new Party Constitution. Six major resolutions were 
passed at the plenum. They were: 
1. Elevation of Zhao Ziyang to the Politburo Standing 
Committee. 
2. Restoration of the CC Central Secretariat; election of Hu 
Y aobang as the General Secretary and ten others as Secretaries. 
3. Ousting of Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui and Chen 
Xilien from the Politburo. 
4. Rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, describing Liu's case the most 
serious frame-up mistake of the PRC history. 
5. Adoption of the "Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Polit-
ical Life," in an effort to restore the Party norms which prevailed at 
the time of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. 
6. Erasure from the Constitution of citizen's four rights to 
"speak out freely, air one's views fully, hold great debates, and write 
big -character posters." 
CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1980 
The agenda apparently discussed the following six issues: 
1. The demotion of Hua Guofeng and other personnel 
changes to be followed. Reportedly Deng criticized Hua for his: 
personality cult, preventing Deng and Chen Yun from being rehabil-
itated in 1977, insistence on "Two Whatevers," resisting the principle 
of "Seek[ing] Truth from Facts," and mistakes in economic moderni-
zation plan.32 It was decided that Hua relinquished his positions as 
Chairman of both the Party and the Military Commission. Hu 
Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping would replace him in these two posi-
tions. Hua would be demoted to the Party Vice-Chairman. 
2. The revised draft of the Party Constitution. 
3. The draft of a proposed new PRC Constitution especially 
with reference to the issue of restoring the office of PRC President, a 
position Liu Shaoqi held when he was purged. 
32. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1981, p. 11-2. 
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4. The proposed "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several 
Historical Questions Since the Funding of the PRC." 
5. The newly proposed economic readjustment plan, which 
reimposed administrative controls, centralization and unification, 
and increasing governmental intervention in the economy.33 
6. The date and agenda for the 12th Party Congress. 
THE SIXTH PLENUM, JUNE, 1981 
The session was relatively short, from June 27 to June 29. But 
the preparatory meetings prior to that were long, lasting eleven days. 
Apparently, many of the debates and substantive discussions took 
place in the preparatory meetings. The principal actions were: 
1. Passing the "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several His-
torical Questions Since the Founding of the PRC." The document 
makes a conclusive evaluation of Mao's role in the PRC history. 
2. Officially demoting Hua to Vice-Chairman; Hu was elected 
Party Chairman, Deng was made Military Commission Chairman, 
and Zhao was elevated to Party Vice-Chairman. Ranking of the 
Politburo Standing Committee was set in the order of Hu, Ye, Deng, 
Zhao, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Hua. Hu Yaobang continued on 
as the CC General Secretary. 
3. Election of Xu Zhongxun as Secretary of the Central 
Secretariat. 
The Twelfth Party Congress 
The Twelfth Party Congress was held in Peking from Septem-
ber 1 to September 11, with 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates at-
tending. In the opening speech Deng Xiaoping declared this to be 
the most important meeting held since the Seventh Party Congress in 
1945, thereby totally downgrading the rest of the Congresses held 
since the founding of the People's Republic.34 In the speech, Deng 
set forth four basic tasks for the nation: 1) to restructure the admin-
istration and the economic set-up in order to make the ranks of cad-
res more revolutionary, of a younger average age, better educated, 
and more professionally competent; 2) to build a socialist spiritual 
civilization; 3) to strike at criminal activities in economic and other 
areas that undermine socialism; and 4) to rectify the Party style of 
33. For more details on this plan, see Solinger, supra note 8, p. 1240. 
34. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 36 (September 16, 1982), p. 5. 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 19 
work and consolidate the Party organization on the basis of a careful 
study of the new Party Constitution. 
The Congress listened to Hu Yaobang's lengthy political report 
which contained some 34,000 words. This was the longest political 
report ever delivered at the Party Congress in the PRC history.35 
Gordon Bennett and Lowell Dittmer have suggested that steady re-
duction in length of the political report prior to 1982 signaled the 
possible decline of the Party Congress as a forum for decision-mak-
ing and discussion of major issues.36 By this yardstick, the Twelfth 
Congress could represent a reversal of the previous trend, and could 
indicate that the Party Congress is being reinvigorated as an impor-
tant forum. However, its unwieldy number of delegates would pre-
vent it from becoming an effective decision-making body. The party 
machine controlled by Deng and Hu had every reason to dramatize 
the importance of this Party Congress. It represented an important 
milestone in the rise to power of the Deng-Hu leadership and the 
major policies they favor. It also ended a long process of atrocious 
political struggles, and began a new era. 
The Congress adopted a new Party Constitution with a total of 
fifty lengthy articles in ten chapters, almost as long as the 1956 Con-
stitution. As Bennett has pointed out elsewhere, the Party Constitu-
tions adopted at the Ninth and Tenth Congresses were much shorter 
than the 1956 Constitution, and gave only slight attention to matters 
concerning central and local Party organizations.37 By comparison, 
the new Constitution devotes seven of its ten long chapters to elabo-
rate in detail the scope and structure of activities for the Party orga-
nizations. Such an effort adds additional testimony to the new 
leadership's emphasis on Party rebuilding. The task of Party re-
building gathered momentum at the Eleventh CC's Fifth Plenum in 
February 1979 when the Central Secretariat was restored; it is now 
officially reinstituted in the Constitution. The Party chairmanship 
was abolished in favor of a collective leadership formula. 
The Congress also elected 348 members (21 0 regulars, 135 alter-
35. Compared with Liu Shaoqi's 31,000 words in 1956 (Eighth), Lin Biao's 16,000 
words in 1969 (Ninth), Wang Hongwen's 6,500 words in 1973 (Tenth), and Hua 
Guofeng's 4,300 words in 1977 (Eleventh). For reference see Gordon A. Bennett, China's 
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions and Central Committees: An Institu-
tional Overview and Comparison, University of Texas, Austin: Center for Asian Studies, 
Occasional Paper Series, Number I, 1974, p. 5. 
36. Ibid. Also see Lowell Dittmer, "The Formal Structure of Central Chinese Polit-
ical Institutions" in Sidney Greenblatt, Richard W. Wilson and Amy Auerbacher (eds)., 
Organizational Behavior in Chinese Society, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981, p. 61. 
37. Bennett, supra note 35, p. 7. 
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nates) to the Central Committee, 1972 to the Central Advisory Com-
mission (CAC), and 132 to the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI). The CAC provides honorific positions to the ag-
ing cadres whose active political lives have apparently come to an 
end. Their appointments to the CAC may be regarded as a face-
saving measure in order to retire them with grace. There is little 
evidence that their alleged "advisory" functions amount to signifi-
cant factors in the governing of China. 
The CCDI is expected to be more active than the CAC as the 
Party enters a nationwide campaign to tighten discipline and to 
crack down on the rapidly growing number of cases of economic 
corruption. Chen Yun and General Huang Kecheng, purged in con-
nection with the Peng Dehuai case in 1959, were appointed the First 
Secretary and the Second Secretary respectively. But Wang 
Heshou-the Permanent Secretary-is expected to run the commis-
sion's daily operations. The CCDI's predecessor-Central Control 
Commission-was abolished at the Ninth Congress ( 1969) and later 
restored at the Eleventh Congress (1977). Its current institutional 
arrangement will enable it to exercise functional supervision over a 
nation-wide network of provincial Commissions on Inspecting Disci-
pline. How the CCDI implements its important assignments in con-
junction with the powerful Central Secretariat, provincial Party 
Secretaries, and the public security forces remains somewhat 
unclear. 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
The Twelfth Central Committee held its first plenary session on 
September 12-13 immediately following the closing of the Congress. 
In addition to the approval of the newly elected CAC and CCDI 
members, the committee exercised the most important duty of elect-
ing its General Secretary, Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Mili-
tary Commission, and members of the Central Secretariat, the ruling 
Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. The fact that the 
First Plenum was brief suggests the election results had all been pre-
determined, most likely by such powerful figures as Deng Xiaoping, 
Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and a few others in mutual 
consultation. 
Only a limited number of the Eleventh CC members were re-
elected. The figures we have indicate 137 or 39 percent of the 333 
original members from the Eleventh Party Congress survived. 
Table A 
Survival Rate of Politburo and Central Committee Members 
Party Congressa Survival Rate {in %} 
8th 9th lOth llth 12th 8th on 9th 9th on lOth lOth on llth llth on 12th 
Politburo 26 25 25 23 27 35% (9) 64% (16) 60% (l5)b 52% (12)** 
(total) 
Standing Committee 
of Politburo 7 5 9 5 6 
Alternates 6 4 4 3 3 
(Death Adjusted) 2* 39% 73% 71%*** 57% 
Central Committee 195 279 319 333 348 28%(54) 72%(202) 56%C 39%(137)d 
Regulars 97 170 195 201 210 
Alternates 98 109 124 132 138 
• Death: Liu Bocheng, Su Zhenhua 
•• Purged or demoted: Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Xu Shiyou, Chen Yonggui, Geng Biao, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen 
Xilian, Peng Chong, Seypidin 
• • • Deceased were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Dong Piwu and Kang Sheng. 
Sources: a. Figures on the 8th-10th Party Congresses are from Bennett, supra note 35, pp.23-25. 
b. This author's own calculation. 
c. James R. Townsend, Politics: China, 2nd edition, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980, p. 
264. 
d. Information from Xu Xing, "Ping Zhonggong di shier qu dahui" (On the CCP 12th Party Congress) Zheng 
Ming, No. 60 (October 1982), pp. 48-50. 
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As Table A shows, this survival rate was lower than those of the 
Ninth CC and even the Tenth CC, and only slightly higher than the 
Ninth CC which followed the extensive purges during the peak pe-
riod of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the rise of the Deng 
group to political eminence may have entailed widespread purges, 
mostly in the forms of demotion or forced retirement. 
THE POLITBURO 
Turnover in the Politburo was also substantial. As Table A in-
dicates, only twelve or 52 percent of the original twenty-three mem-
bers elected in the First Plenum of the Eleventh CC survived. 
Taking into account two deceased members-Su Zhenhua and Liu 
Bocheng-the survival rate remains only 57 percent. This compares 
unfavorably with the survival rate of 64 percent (or 73 percent) be-
tween the Ninth and the Tenth Central Committee's First Plenary 
sessions, but significantly higher than the 35 percent between the 
Eighth and the Ninth due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution. 
The fact that the Politburo members' survival rate was higher 
than those of the CC poses the possibility that while some senior 
leaders remain in the Politburo, their proteges in the second echelon 
were demoted or forced out of office altogether. Furthermore, if one 
traces the evolution of turnover in the Politburo between the Elev-
enth CC's Third Plenum and the Twelfth CC's First Plenum, recent 
changes in the Politburo composition may not seem nearly as signifi-
cant. As Table B shows, four members, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, 
Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen were added to the ruling body at the 
Third Plenum, while Zhao Ziyang and Peng Zhen subsequently 
joinedit at the Fourth Plenum in 1979. Conversely, the "little gang 
of four"-Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De and Chen Xilian-
were removed at the Fifth Plenum (1980). Chen Yonggui, the fa-
mous Dazhai leader, lost his post at the Sixth Plenum (1981 ). 
Change in the Politburo appears to follow the pattern of adding new 
members (Third and Fifth Plenums) with the subsequent removals 
(Fourth and Sixth Plenums) of the current members whose power 
and status had become weaker. 
The current Politburo is packed with members of the rehabili-
tated old guard, all of whom are Deng's confidants. Hua Guofeng 
was ousted, and allowed to remain in the Central Committee per-
haps only as a face-saving gesture. After all, it was Hua who co-
engineered the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. Among the noted 
supporters of Hua, only Ye Jianying, General Li Desheng (Shen-
yang Military Region) and Ni Zhifu (the youthful Director of All-
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China Federation of Trade Unions) survived. However, in March 
1983 Y e announced he would not seek re-election to the upcoming 
National People's Congress, scheduled to meet in mid-1983. Given 
his age (85) and poor physical condition, his days in political life are 
numbered. Li and Ni may have already switched sides to support 
the Deng-Hu leadership.38 
Among the previous Politburo members, Geng Biao, Peng 
Chong and Wang Renzhong were demoted to the CC membership.39 
Observers in Hong Kong speculate that Geng and Peng may have 
moved too close to Hua's position in recent years, while Wang's re-
moval was allegedly connected with his mishandling of the Bai Hua 
case in his capacity as Director of the CC Propaganda Department. 
Members of the current Politburo average seventy-three years 
of age. It is a body comprised almost completely of national level 
office-holders. Only two--Li Desheng and Qin Jiwei (Commander 
of Beijing Military Region)-are from the Military Region. Several 
of its members-Ye, Ulanhu, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian-
have in fact become politically inactive. Even Li Xiannian was 
stripped of his functional duties in the State Council, before being 
elected to the newly-restored position of the President of the Repub-
lic. The composition of the current Politburo therefore leaves room 
for the possibility of more substitution in the next CC Plenary ses-
sion. The weeding-out process desired by Deng and his associates 
may thus continue for a little while longer. In short, the vast major-
ity of the Politburo members appears to be closely allied with Deng, 
Hu, and Chen Yun. All of them hold concurrent leadership posi-
tions in the Central Secretariat, Military Commission, and the State 
Council. 
38. See Li Desheng, "Zhixu qingchu zho di xuxiang yingxiang, nuli kaichuang budui 
jianshe di xin jumen" (continue to eradicate the influence of leftist thinking, strive for a 
new situation in the reconstruction of military forces). Renmin Ribao, Aprill3, 1983, p. 
5. In the article, Li called for turning the PLA into a strong "Modern art regularized 
revolutionary military force." He also urged the eradication of influence on the PLA of 
the leftist errors. The strongest indication of his crossover to support Deng was his praise 
of Deng's "remarkable achievements" in purging the leftist and rightist influence after he 
assumed the position as chairman of the Military Commission. 
39. Hai Feng, "Zhonggong xuanchuan buzhang yi ren mu huo" (Behind the change 
of CCP Propaganda Head), Zheng Ming, No. 55 (May 1982), pp. 16-17; and Luo Bing, 
"Zhonggong wenwu gaogan di fuchen" (The ups and downs of PRC high officials), 
Zheng Ming, No. 62 (December 1982), pp. 7-11. Peng Chong is also charged for his 
allegedly "corrupt" life-style - indulging in materialistic luxuries. The arrest of his son 
on charges of economic crimes may also have affected him. See Zhongguo Shibao 
[China Times (New York)], April 2, 1983, p. 8. 
Table B IV 
.s:.. 
POLITBURO 
(CCP 12th Party Congress) 
Provincial 
Standing Committee: ~ Origin Party Secretariat State Council PLA NPC Others () --
Hu Yaobang8 67 Hunan General 0 
Secretary z 
o-j Ye Jianying 85 Guangdong Vice-Chm. tT1 
Military ~ 
Comm. ., 
Deng Xiaoping 79 Sichuan Chairman Chairman- 0 
Military Central Advis- ~ 
Comm ory Commission ::c 
Zhao Ziyangb 65 Henan Premier -< 
Li Xiannjan 78 Hubei PRC President > Chen Yun8 78 Jiangsu I st Secretary- (/l 
-Commission for > 
Inspecting z 
Discipline Vl 
o-j 
Regular Members: (In order of Surname Strokes) c 
Wan Lie 66 Shan dong Secretary Vice-Premier 0 
Xi Zhongxunc 71 Shanxi Secretary Vice-Chairman tri 
Wang Zhen8 75 Hunan President, (/l 
Central Party Vl tT1 School ::c 
Wei Guoqing 76 Guangxi Vice-Chairman tri 
Ulanfu 77 Sui yuan PRC Vice- (/l 
President 
Fang Yi 74 Fujian State Councillor: 
State Scientific & 
Li Desheng 67 Hubei 
Technological Comm. 
Commander 
Shenyang 
Mil. Reg. 
Table B (continued) 
Provincial 
Standing Committee: ~ Origin Party Secretariat State Council PLA NPC Others 
Deng Yingchaoa 78 Henan Vice Chairman Chairman-
Chinese 
People's Political 
Consultative Conf. 
Yang Shangkunc 77 Sichuan Permanent Vice Chairman 
Vice-Chm. Sect.-Gen. (') 
Military 0 
Comm. ~ 
Yang Dezhic 73 Hunan Chief of ~ 
Gen. Staff c 
Yu Qiuli 68 Jiangxi Secretary State Councillor Director, z Vi Gen. Pol. >-l 
Dept. 
"t) Song Renqiongc 78 Hunan Organization > 
Department ::0 
Head >-l 
Hu Qiaomuc 72 Jiangsu Secretary Party -< 0 ideology and 
'T1 
party member (') education 
:X Nie Rongzhen 84 Sichuan Vice Chm. z Mil. Com. > Ni Zhifu 50 Shanghai Dir. All-China 
Federation 
of Trade Unions 
Xu Xiangqian 81 Shaanxi Vice-Chm. 
Mil. Com. 
Peng Zhenb 81 Shaanxi Vice 
Chairman 
Liao Chengzhic 75 Guangdong Dir. Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Off. 
Alternate Members: (In order of votes) N Vo 
Table B (continued) 
Provincial 
Standing Committee: ~ Origin Party Secretariat State Council PLA NPC Others 
Yao Yilin 66 Auhui Secretary Vice-Premier; 
State 
Planning 
Commission 
Qin Jiwei 69 Hubei Commander 
Beijing 
Military 
Region 
Chen Muhua 67 Zhejiang State Council-
lor; Economic 
Relations with 
Foreign Countries 
Average age 73 (Woman) 
a. Membership since the 3rd plenum, 1978 
b. Membership since the 4th plenum, 1979 
c. New members, the 12th Party Congress, 1982. Liao has passed away. At this writing his replacement in the Politburo is not known. 
Sources: 
Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (Sept. 20, 1982). 
Hierarchies of the People's Republic o/ China, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1975). 
Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary o/ Chinese Communism 1921-1965, Vols. I & II (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1982. Ting Wang, supra note 4, pp. 1-17. 
Zheng ming, Hong Kong: supra note Table A. 
Xu Xing, No. 60, supra note Table A; Hai Feng, No. 55, supra note 39, pp. 13-29; Luo Bing, No. 62, supra note 39; "Zhonggong san 
zhong chuanhuijuanji" (A special edition on the CCP third plenum), No 15 (January 1979), pp. 17-30; Luo Bing, "Fanshipai shi shi 
ji" (An account of the Whateverist Faction's loss of power base), No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8; Du Feng, "Wang Dongxing wei shi 
mo hui xiatai" (What caused the downfall of Wang Dongxing). No. 30 (April 1980), pp. 34-40; Luo Bing, "Yu Qiuli zhong yu 
xiaochuan" (Yu Qiuli's authorities are finally cut down). No. 33 (July 1980), pp. 7-9; Luo Bing, "Hu Yaobang shili pengzhang yu 
Deng Hu tixi" (Expansion of Hu Yaobang's power bases and the Deng-Hu system), No. 59 (September 1982), pp. 9-13; and Luo Bing, 
"Deng Xiaoping xiangjunzhong zuo wang kaidao" (Deng Xiaoping is purging the military's leftist leaders), no. 61 (November 1982). 
pp. 7-12. 
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CENTRAL SECRETARIAT 
Restoration of the Central Secretariat at the Eleventh CC's 
Fifth Plenum is one of the most important institutional develop-
ments since the Third Plenum. It was abolished during the Cultural 
Revolution at the order of Mao. During 1956-66 when Deng was 
General Secretary, the Secretariat grew powerful enough for Mao to 
feel threatened by it. Many of its functions were then turned over to 
the CC General Office and the Central Cultural Revolution Group 
(Zhongyang Wenge Xiaozu) under the control of the Gang of Four. 
Restoring the Secretariat was an important step toward re-insti-
tutionalizing the Party powers. The new Party Constitution stipu-
lates that "[T)he Secretariat attends to the day-to-day work of the 
Central Committee under the direction of the Political Bureau and 
its Standing Committee" (Article 21 ). The constitutional delegation 
of authorities thus is general and brief, leaving considerable room 
for its expansion of activities. Since 1980 the Secretariat has done 
just that. These activities will be discussed below. 
The Fifth Plenum elected eleven persons to the Secretariat, with 
Hu Yaobang as the General Secretary. Others elected were: Wan 
Li, Wang Renzhong, Song Renqiong, Fang Yi, Gu Mu, Yu Qiuli, 
Yang Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu, Yao Yilin, and Peng Chong. Xi 
Zhongxun was added to the roster at the Eleventh CC's Sixth Ple-
num (1981). The twelfth CC elected, in addition to Hu Yaobang, 
nine secretaries-Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong, 
Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin, and two 
alternates (Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu). As Table C indicates, their 
average age was sixty-four, considerably younger and perhaps better 
educated (Deng Liqun and Hu Qili are reported to be graduates of 
Beijing University) than the Politburo members as a whole. Four of 
the previous secretaries-Wan, Song, Hu Qiaomu and Yang 
Dezhi-were promoted to the Politburo in 1982, partly as a result of 
reassigning their major areas of responsibility while making room 
for other upcoming confidants of Hu Yaobang. Wang Renzhong 
and Peng Chong were ousted from the secretariat perhaps because of 
the same reasons which accounted for their removal from the 
Politburo. 
The additions of Deng Liqun, the late Yang Yong, Chen Pixian, 
Hu Qili, Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu to the roster are significant in at 
least two respects. They are relatively young (average sixty-one 
years of age) and better educated, thus fulfilling the current policy 
objective in recruiting younger cadres and leaders. They are known 
to be proteges of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang. 
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Their appointments were highlighted in a biographic sketch in 
Renmin Ribao (4/13/82, p. 3) and in Beijing Review (September 20, 
1982, pp. 22-24). Hu Qili and Chen Pixian, who is the only provin-
cial Party Secretary to be member of either the Politburo or the Cen-
tral Secretariat, laid a foundation for their careers in the Communist 
Youth League (CYL) ofwhich Hu Yaobang was the First Party Sec-
retary in the 1950s.40 It will be only a matter of time before these 
new members of the Secretariat join the Politburo roster. 
40. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (September 20, 1982), pp. 23-24. 
General Secrerary: 
Hu Yaobang 67 
Secreraries: 
Wan Li 66 
Xi Zhongxun 71 
Deng Liqun• 68 
Yang Yong• 71 
Yu Qiuli 68 
Gu Mu 68 
Chen Pixian • 67 
Hu Qi!i• 54 
Yao Yilin 66 
A!lernales: 
Qiao Shi• 59 
Hao Jianxiu• 48 
-
Average age 64 
Hunan 
Shandong 
Shanxi 
Hunan 
Hunan 
Jiangxi 
Shan dong 
Fujian 
Shaanxi 
Anhui 
Zhejiang 
Shan dong 
Table C 
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT 
(CCP 12th Party Congress) 
Politburo Standing Committee 
Vice-Premier; Politburo 
NPC Vice-Chairman; Politburo 
Head of CC Propaganda Department Director, Secretariat Research 
Office 
PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff 
Director, PLA General Political Department 
State Councillor 
I st Secretary 
Hubei Party Committee 
Director, General Office, Central Committee 
Vice-Premier; State Planning Commission (Minister) 
Head of International Liaison Department 
Minister of Textile Industries 
• New Members. Yang Yong has passed away. As of this writing his replacement is unknown. 
Sources: 
(Woman) 
Donald W. Klein and Anne B. C!ark,Biographic DiclionaryofChinese Communism, 1921-1965, Vols. I & II. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971. 
Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (September 20, 1982), pp. 22-24. 
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MILITARY LEADERS IN THE PARTY 
Institutionally speaking, the PRC political system maintains 
three hierarchies of power structure-the Party, the PLA, and the 
government. Leading members of each hierarchy hold positions in 
the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Because of the CCP's 
experience in the protracted revolutionary wars prior to 1949, mili-
tary commanders have had a substantial share in the membership of 
both the CC and Politburo. As Table D indicates, during 1956-1977, 
the percentage of active military professionals in both bodies fluctu-
ated between 28.5 percent in the Tenth CC (1973) and 52.2 percent 
in the Eleventh CC Politburo (1977). In spite of the overall rise of 
military power during the peak period of the Cultural Revolution, 
an increase in their representation in both was only marginal. Dur-
ing these twenty-one years, military representation in the CC was 
quite steady, staying within a relatively narrow range of 30 percent 
to 44 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of military com-
manders who occupied the post of Provincial First Secretary shows a 
remarkable fluctuation, rising from seven percent in 1965 to 72 per-
cent in 1971. Such a dramatic increase reflected the virtual collapse 
of the Party structure in the face of disruption by the Red Guards 
and the radicals. By 1977 the percentage illustrated a dramatic 
dive-indicating the trend since the 1971 Lin Biao affair-toward 
the revival of civilian control over the Party machinery at the 
provincal level. 
TableD 
Military Representation in Party Posts 
A. National: 8th cc lith Elenum 9th cc lOth cc lith CC 3rd Plenum 
1956 1958 1959 1973 1977 1978 
Politburo: 41.2% 40.0% 47.6% 28.6% 52.2% 44.4% 
(7 I 17) (8/20) (10/21) (6/21) (12/23) ( 12/27) 
Central 
Committee 31% 44% 32% 30% 
(Regular 
members) (30/97) (75/170) (63/195) (61/201) 
B. Provincial First Secretaries: 
1965 1971 1975 1977 1981 
Total 29 29 29 29 29 
Military 2 21 14 6 2 
% 7 72 48 21 7 
Sources: 
4th Elenum 6th Elenum 12th CC 
1979 1981 1982 
42.9% 
(11/28) 
37.5% 
(9/24) 
25.9% 
(7 /27) 
19.5% 
(41/210) 
Figures for the 1956-1981 period are from Shin Chugoku Nenkan (New China Yearbook), Tokyo, Japan, 1982, pp. 103. 
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As the following chart indicates, since the Eleventh Party Con-
gress, military representation in all three categories again entered a 
period of steady decline. In the first session, active military officers 
made up approximately only 19.5 percent (or 41) of the 210 CC full 
members, and 25.9 percent (or 7) of the twenty-seven Politburo 
members. By 1981 there were only two provincial First Party Secre-
taries of military orientation left. 
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There are several important reasons accounting for the decline of 
military influence in Party affairs: 
1) Civilian Party-state cadres who were purged during the 
Cultural Revolution have been rehabilitated. By the 
end of 1980, for instance twenty-five of the twenty-nine 
provincial First Secretary posts were taken over by the 
rehabilitated cadres.41 
2) The policy pursued by the Deng-Hu leadership has 
aimed at undermining the power bases of influential 
military commanders in an apparent effort to eliminate 
possible sources of challenge to the new Party authori-
ties. Deng Xiaoping has effectively utilized his powers 
as Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the 
Military Commission (1977-1980). Later as Chairman 
of Military Commission (1981-) he rigorously 
41. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1980, supra note 21 p. 12. 
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pushed for widespread change of commanders. Since 
1979, ten of the eleven PLA Regional Commanders 
have been removed (only Li Desheng keeps his Shen-
yang post), while twenty-two of the twenty-eight Pro-
vincial Military District Commanders changed 
hands.42 
3) Deng's military modernization programs encounter 
fierce opposition from many military leaders. A crack-
down against the dissidents is deemed necessary in or-
der to implement these programs. According to one 
writer, his programs include: reasserting Party and 
government control over the military forces; restricting 
the PLA to an essentially military role; professionaliz-
ing military ranks and eliminating the overaged, un-
skilled and unqualified; and modernizing the defense 
only as a function of economic modernization as a 
whole.43 In addition, many PLA officers apparently re-
sented cutbacks in the defense budget, the low priority 
given to national defense, the one-child campaign, and 
the rural policy to reorganize grassroot agricultural 
economy.44 Deng-Hu's determination to downgrade 
Mao and Maoism has also met with resistance. 45 Op-
position and resistance from the PLA officers necessi-
tated the Party Center's retaliatory actions. 
33 
In the final analysis, those PLA officers who subscribe to the Party 
leadership and the current national policy measures are the only 
ones likely to survive in office. At this juncture it appears highly 
unlikely that the military leaders will contemplate a political come-
back. Their territorial bases have been severely weakened, and their 
voices at the Party's decision-making level substantially curtailed. 
42. Cited in V. G. Kulkarni, "Rearguard Action." Far Eastern Economic Review 
(hereinafter cited as FEER) (Oct. 8, 1982), p. II. 
43. Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China," Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 8 (August 1982), p. 692. 
44. See Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s, The 
China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), p. 242; Jurgen Domes, "New Policies in the Com-
munes: Notes on Rural Societal Structures in China, 1976-1981 ,"Journal of Asian Stud-
ies, vol. XLI, No. 2 (Feb. 1982), pp. 256, 263-264; Pi-chao Chen and Adrienne Kols, 
Population and Birth Planning in the People's Republic of China, The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity's Population Reports, Series J, No. 25, Jan-Feb. 1982, p. 600. 
45. Luo Bing, "The Ups and Downs," supra note 39. 
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FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE POWER ELITES 
The Twelfth Party Congress was orchestrated by Deng, Hu, 
Zhao, and Chen Yun. This was evident from the very beginning 
when Deng made the opening speech and Hu delivered a lengthy 
political report. Both emphasized basically the same themes, which 
had been evolving since the Third Plenum. The day before the Con-
gress opened its sessions, Zhao Ziyang was elected Secretary Gen-
eral of the Congress by the thirty-one member Presidium Standing 
Committee; while Deng and Hu's confidants-Hu Qiaomu, Xi 
Zhongxun, Yang Shangkun, Deng Liqun, and Hu Qili-were 
elected Vice-Secretary Generals. Deng's other protege, Song Ren-
qiong, who heads the CC Organization Department, served as Di-
rector of the Congress Membership Committee. In short, the 
Congress was a triumphant occasion for the rehabilitated power 
elite. 
The fact that elderly leaders such as Ye Jianying did not retire 
to the CAC can be interpreted as a minor setback for Deng's widely 
circulated policy to retire them. On the other hand, the presence of 
such senior statesmen as Ye, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Nie 
Rongzhan, Xu Xiangqian, and Deng Yingchao (Madame Zhou En-
lai) in the Politburo at least adds some validity to the facade of unity 
ofleadership. The truth of the matter is that none of them have been 
very active in functional responsibility. Their health is deteriorating. 
On the surface, Y e, Nie and Xu remain as Vice-Chairman of the 
Military Commission while Deng Yingchao and Chen Yun carry 
concurrent titles as NPC Vice-Chairman and CCDI First Secretary 
respectively. These titles and responsibilities are more honorific 
than substantive politically. 
The exercise of political powers now rests with the Dengist oli-
garchy which consists of the following individuals: 
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Party Bureaucracy: Hu Yaobang 
Song Renqiong 
Wang Zhen 
Hu Qiaomu 
Hu Qili 
Deng Liqun 
PLA: Deng Xiaoping 
Yang Shangkun 
Yang Dezhi 
Qin Jiwei 
State Bureaucracy: Zhao Ziyang 
Wan Li 
Yao Yilin 
Fang Yi 
National People's Congress* 
Peng Zhen 
Politburo Standing Committee 
member and CC General 
Secretary 
Politburo member and Head of the 
CC Organization Department 
Poliburo member and President of 
the Central Party School 
Politburo member, Party Secretary, 
and top ideologist 
Party Secretary and Director of the 
CC General Office Center 
Party Secretary and Head of the 
CC Propanganda Department 
Politburo Standing Committee 
member, Chairman of Military 
Commission and of the CAC; the 
only true generalist leader, and the 
only one with the title of chairman 
(Zhuxi). 
Politburo member, Permanent 
Vice-Chairman and Secretary 
General of Military Commission 
assisting Deng to control the 
Commission affairs 
Politburo member and Chief of 
General Staff 
Politburo alternate and 
Commander of the strategically 
critical Beijing Military Region 
Politburo Standing Committee 
member and Premier 
Politburo member, Party Secretary, 
Vice-Premier in charge of 
agricultural policy 
Politburo alternate, Party 
Secretary, Vice-Premier, and 
Director of State Planning 
Commission 
Politburo member, State 
Councillor, and Director of State 
Scientific and Technological 
Commission 
Politburo member and NPC 
ranking Vice Chairman (probably 
next Chairman) 
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Xi Zhongxun 
Yang Shangkun 
Politburo member, Party Secretary 
and NPC Vice Chairman, perhaps 
a liaison man between NPC and 
the Central Secretariat 
Politburo member, NPC Vice 
Chairman and Secretary General 
(in charge of NPC communication 
flow and coordinating activities) 
* NPC as an institution is becoming important due to the PRC's recent 
policy emphasis on national unity and functional differentiation be-
tween government and party. See Solinger, supra note 8, pp. 1239-
1269. 
Career patterns of these people in recent years lend support to 
the view that they have formed a grand coalition, with a varying 
degree of interpersonal bonds. As a political group they appear to be 
firmly in control of the upper layers of PRC's institutional hierar-
chies. Outsiders can never fully comprehend the internal workings 
of this interlocking power network. Available information about it, 
drawn from published statements and career experiences of the net-
work members, provide strong evidence for surmising that they are 
strong personalities with a broad policy consensus. Practically all of 
these men were purged during the Cultural Revolution. None of 
them have been cited as supporters ofthe Gang of Four, Lin Biao, or 
Hua; neither have they been known for being sympathetic with the 
Maoist radical policies. All of them have major functional jurisdic-
tion while maintaining direct access to the highest decision-making 
organs. The only powerful figures who remain functionally active 
but not included in this interlocking network are Li Xiannian, Yu 
Qiuli and Li Desheng. As a senior statesmen, Li Xiannian remains 
influential without actual functional assignments. Yu is widely rec-
ognized as the leading figure of the Petroleum Clique. His appoint-
ment last fall to replace Wei Guoqing as Director of the PLA's 
General Political Department is something of a mystery to many ob-
servers, including this author. Li Desheng has continued to survive 
since the late 1960s, despite all the political odds against him, and 
has remained as the commanding officer of the strategic Shenyang 
Military Region. One can only speculate that he has probably struck 
a compromise with Deng. Even if this is true, it would be a folly to 
include him in the inner circle with Deng, Hu and Zhao. 
Within this functional network of the Den gist power elite, those 
connected with the Party bureaucracy deserve more attention. As 
the Party moves ahead to reassert its authority and to rebuild its bu-
reaucratic network of power, the Central Secretariat may grow fur-
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ther in importance. Hu Yaobang is clearly using the Secretariat to 
establish his power base. Because he controls the Party's bureau-
cratic center, more of his trusted friends and ex-colleagues in the 
CYL may be given important future assignments in the provinces 
and cities.46 
THE ESSENCE OF GROUP POLITICS 
Chinese politics at the levels of both policy-making and imple-
mentation have demonstrated a strong propensity toward group con-
flicts.47 Group tension permeated the political arena particularly 
when ideology and policy disputes intensified and institutional func-
tions weakened. The virtual destruction of the Party and the partial 
paralysis of state institutions during the Cultural Revolution intro-
duced a political process whereby rules of the game were constrained 
very little by the institutional norms and procedures. The question 
of group politics being sui generis to the Chinese because of their 
social and cultural characteristics remains moot. Scholarly interest 
in group analysis of Chinese politics-be it in factions or cliques or 
other group phenomena-is strongly influenced by the historical pat-
tern of Chinese political conflicts since 1958. One may also argue 
that the nature of PRC group politics has characteristics closely 
linked to its developmental stage. When institutional development 
becomes stronger and is eventually established, one suspects the 
level of informal group conflicts would wither, subside, or at least be 
replaced partially by more institutionally based group behaviors. 
From 1978 to 1982, the PRC's institutional development contin-
ued to suffer from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Party re-
building and the reform of state administration clearly had started at 
the national and provincial levels. But the efforts to achieve more 
efficient and differentiated institutional governing structures had 
been obstructed by Deng's opponents. Institutional development it-
self in fact became an issue in group conflicts. 
46. Those who are being identified as sharing with Hu Yaobang the Chinese Youth 
League career backgrounds and are considered personally close to him include: Wu 
Xueqian (Foreign Minister), Xiang Nan (Fujian First Party Secretary), Hu Qili (Mayor 
of Tienjin), Feng Wenbin (Vice President of Central Party School), Liang Buting 
(Qinghai First Party Secretary), Hu Keshi (Associate Dean of National Academy of Sci-
ences), Li Chang (Executive President, Presidium of National Academy of Sciences), and 
Yu Weijing (publisher of Beijing Daily). See Luo Bing "Hu Yaobang shili" supra note 
Table B. 
47. In general, groups are not institutionalized organizations; neither do they have 
clear boundaries or internal rules which can be observed. Their importance varies in 
time, and fluctuates according to conflict arena. 
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In the period under study, one can identify at least three levels 
in the intensity of group conflict which corresponded to different ar-
eas of debate. The highest level involved ideological disputes over 
Mao and Maoism, which were intertwined with personal striving for 
power and influence. The second level was characterized by conflict 
over military modernization and the PLA's role in politics; the third 
by policy differences regarding economic modernization-its overall 
thrust, developmental strategy, and sectoral rankings in priority. 
The intensity of conflict at each level varied, but it corresponded 
with the descending order of the three levels above. Every major 
participant in the national politics of that time conceivably possessed 
views on each of the issues of these three areas of conflict. Many of 
these men probably perceived the ultimate resolution of the conflict 
as being intimately linked to the progress of their own careers. As 
Michel Oksenberg would argue, the issues and choices these conflicts 
of view and interest pose "determine the parameters and the oppor-
tunities for the exercise of power."48 Available evidence indicates 
the existence of two principal adversary groups in each conflict 
arena. Participants only marginally involved in each arena would 
play supportive roles or simply chose to be cast as bystanders. The 
overriding factors which shaped the formation of political groups 
were most likely to include: ideological perspective, policy prefer-
ence, position and power, common college ties in the past or present, 
a shared institutional base, and shared personal stakes during the 
Cultural Revolution. Combinations of any of these factors resulted 
in mutual reinforcement, providing a basis for grouping. 
A. Conflicts over Mao, Maoism and Political Powers 
Once the Gang of Four and their principal allies were arrested, 
PRC politics immediately turned to the fundamental issues of Mao 
and Maoism. Many leaders who owed their political fortunes to 
Mao during the Cultural Revolution had remained loyal to him and 
insisted that Mao's deeds and thought be inequivocally followed. 
They included such prominent figures as Hua Guofeng, Wang 
Dongxing (Mao's ex-bodyguard), Chen Xilian (Commander of Beij-
ing Military Region), Wu De (Mayor of Beijing), Ji Dengkui and 
Chen Yonggui (both identified as leaders in agricultural field). The 
regime's continuing adherence to Mao and Maoism would have le-
48. Oksenberg, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," supra note 2, p. 3. Oksenberg did 
not discuss these three levels of conflict. Rather, he was attempting to link Chinese poli-
tics with such major issues as China's distinct path of development. 
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gitimized the powerful positions they then occupied. On the other 
hand, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Xi 
Zhongxun, and Yang Dezhi, for instance, followed the precept that 
Mao did make serious mistakes in his later life, and that canonizing 
his thought was unacceptable. Instead, they invented the slogan that 
"practice is the sole criterion to test truth." Applying this yardstick, 
theory must be rested against reality; as reality changes, theory must 
be modified. The validity of Maoist theories must be continually 
scrutinized-not worshiped. In fact, all of these men had suffered 
immensely, largely because of the alleged mistakes made in the 
name of Mao and Maoism, particularly during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Their return to active political life required some diminution of 
the authority of Mao Zedong. 
The battle line was thus drawn between these two groups. In a 
broader sense, all political beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution 
had good reason to side with Hua's group. By the same token, all 
victims of the Cultural Revolution would have the natural inclina-
tion to back the Dengist position. But only a selective number of the 
elite strata were in the forefront of this tension-ridden confrontation. 
From the standpoint of Deng and his comrades-in-arms, the neo-
Maoists who had played a part in their political misfortunes must be 
identified as the principal targets for political struggle. From the 
Third Plenum to the Fifth Plenum, the Dengist group thus focused 
its efforts on attacking the power bases of these neo-Maoists. Deng-
Hu's control over the central Party bureaucracy, the disbanding of 
Wang Dongxing's "8341" Garrison Troop, the dismissals of Chen 
Xilian and Wu De from their Beijing posts, and the subsequent oust-
ing of Wang, Chen, Wu, Ji, and Chen Y onggui from the Politburo 
effectively crippled the power bases of this group. The CC's official 
reversal of past verdicts on the Tiananmen Incidents, the Peng 
Dehuai case, and later on the Liu Shaoqi case completely cleared the 
way for the Dengist group's return to legitimacy and the tens of 
thousands of cadres implicated in these cases return to active polit-
ical life and career responsibility. 
B. Conflicts Over Military Modernization and the PLA's Political 
Role 
Broadly speaking, the conflicts over military modernization and 
the PLA's political role affected a wide spectrum of the political and 
military elite. But the heart of these controversies had mainly in-
volved conflict between some active military officers and the Deng-
Hu leadership. It would be misleading to portray the military of-
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ficers as a homogeneous group. They are not. In fact, some of the 
military officers, e.g., the late Yang Y ong, Yang Dezhi, Yang 
Shangkun, Zhang Aiping (Defense Minister), and Qin Jiwei, be-
longed to the Deng-Hu camp. Many of Deng's military opponents 
had supported his rehabilitation, opposed the radical excesses of the 
Gang of Four, and did not participate directly in the struggle be-
tween Deng and the "Whateverists." Still, they remained loyal to 
Mao and Maoism. The Dengist military modernization plan was 
viewed as the antithesis of the Maoist military doctrine. 
The Party's decision to pursue modernization since the Third 
Plenum has thus brought about opposition even from those who had 
previously supported Deng. The PLA as a whole has not fared well 
in the priority list of the Four Modernizations. In fact from 1979 to 
1981, the percentage of the military budget in relation to the total 
budget shrunk from 17.48 percent to 16.7 4 percent. 49 As early as 
1975, the Party had instructed the PLA to withdraw from the polit-
ical arena, and to concentrate its efforts on defense and military 
training.50 The PLA's share in the Party's decision-making declined 
steadily since the Eleventh Party Congress. At the Twelfth Party 
Congress, the percentage of PLA members elected to the CC shrunk 
to 19.5 percent; and among the CC alternates, its share was a meager 
15 percent. Members of the old guard with a weak orientation to-
ward modem military warfare have been sent "upstairs" to occupy 
honorific positions in the Central Advisory Commission. Of the 
Commission's 172 members, about one-third are from the military 
ranks. 5 1 All five components of the PRC military modernization as 
enumerated by Thomas Robinson adversely affected the career in-
terests of such old guard members. The programs included:52 
1. Component modernization: training, education, or-
ganization, command, control, communication; 
2. Manpower modernization: size and composition of 
armed forces, age, structure of leadership, etc.; 
3. Material component: physical supports to the armed 
forces, including steady flow of well-trained recruits, 
logistic base, and abilities to feed, house, and clothe the 
military; 
49. Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform, Readjustment, Rectification," Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXII, No. I (January 1982), p. 41. 
50. Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s," supra 
note 44, p. 239. 
51. V. G. Kulkarni, "A Retreat from Power," FEER, April 7, 1983, p. 20. 
52. Robinson, supra note 44, pp. 231-232. 
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4. Doctrinal modernization: in both strategy and tactics; 
5. Societal components: army-Party relationship, issue of 
professionalism, privileges and status of the military 
men. 
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Deng's modernization plans have a practical effect on all of 
these five components. Thus conflicts over each component between 
Deng's reformist policies and the military diehards favoring a status 
quo became inevitable. For instance, the Dengists advocate better 
military education and modern warfare training for the officer corps. 
They want to trim the size of the four million-plus PLA, perhaps by 
as much as a 10 percent reduction in the next five years. 53 A system 
of age limits for each rank-level of the military hierarchy has been 
gradually adopted in much the same way as those of the Party and 
state cadres.54 Forced retirements of the old guard may have 
reached 10-15 percent of the entire officer corps last year alone. 
While senior officers are being pensioned off fast, new recruits have 
been hampered by the rural economic policy and the one-child cam-
paign. Soldiers' prestige, status, and privileges are suffering. The 
Party center is now exerting more control over the PLA personnel 
and propaganda policies. It is only logical that many officers are 
irritated; many perceived their vital interests being threatened 
seriously. 
But the PLA objections to changing military doctrine and over-
all ideological thrust are also profound. Following the removal of 
the commanders implicated in the Lin Biao affair and the Gang of 
Four affair, supporters of Hua's leadership became the principal 
targets of purge. This process ended about the time of the Sixth Ple-
num. The Deng-Hu leadership then turned against many of its pre-
vious supporters, such as Wei Guoqing, Xu Shiyou, and their 
proteges. The PLA political department's "Mishandling" of the Bai 
Hua case triggered another round of purges culminating in the 1982 
dismissal of its Director, Wei Guoqing, his staff and five Regional 
Commanders.55 According to Leo Lee, initial reluctance of the 
Party to reprint the PLA article (in the People's Daily, for instance) 
criticizing Bai Hua's film-script, "Unrequited Love", signaled a rift 
53. Kulkarni, supra note 50, pp. 22. 
54. Ibid. According to Kulkarni, the age limit for divisional-level officers is 50, and 
for the regimental level, 45. 
55. Details about the Bai Hua incident, see Leo Qu-fan Lee "Literary Policy in the 
People's Republic of China: A Position Paper" in Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Mainland China, 
Taiwan and US Policy, Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers, 
Inc. 1983, pp. 108-112; also see Luo Bing, supra note Table B. 
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between the Party and the military; this in tum "angered some high-
echelon generals who brought more pressure to bear on Hu 
Yaobang."56 Wei and his subordinates in the headquarters of the 
PLA Political Department were reportedly harboring a neo-Maoist 
line; so were the ex-Minister of Defense Geng Biao and Politburo 
member Xu Shiyou. Wei and Xu are said to have provided Deng 
with last-ditch protection in Guangdong when Deng was ousted in 
1976-77. 
C. Economic Modernization and the Conflict with the Petroleum 
Clique 
The third arena of group conflict has taken place in the field of 
economic modernization. The policy rift appears to be polarized be-
tween the reformist group of Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and 
Yao Yilin, and the Petroleum Clique, centered on Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, 
Kang Shien and Song Zhenming. Sometimes Deng and Hu's posi-
tions are not clear-cut, but lean toward the reformists in general pol-
icy thrust. 
In addition to Yu, Gu, Kang and Song, the Petroleum Clique 
reportedly also included Tang Ke, Yang Yibang, and Lin Hujia.57 
All of them were associates of Yu Qiuli in the Petroleum Ministry 
when he was Minister in the 1950s and early 1960s. Through the 
years, they formed a close-knit college friendship. During the Cul-
tural Revolution they carried out Maoist economic policies which 
stressed mass mobilization techniques in the production process. 
Their political fortunes were at least partly related to the success of 
the Daqing oil field. Overall they tended to favor centralization, 
with emphasis on heavy industries and agricultural mechanization. 
Jurgen Domes suggests that the Petroleum Clique greatly influenced 
Hua's modernization concept. 58 The Draft Outline of the Ten Year 
Plan for the National Economy, which Hua presented to the first 
session of the Fifth NPC (February 26-March 5, 1978), incorporated 
many of the Petroleum Clique's ideas. As a group they were power-
ful in the State Council during Hua's premiership, particularly from 
1977 to 1980. In fact, from 1978 to 1980 all three major Commis-
sions of the State Council-State Planning, State Economics, and 
56. Lee, Ibid., p. 102. 
57. Tang Ke was Minister of Metallurgical Industry when he signed the agreement to 
build the Bao Shan steel complex with the Japanese. Yang Yibang was Vice Minister of 
Petroleum Ministry. Lin Hujia was Minister of Agriculture and Mayor of Tianjin and 
Beijing. 
58. Domes, "1976-82", supra note 22, pp. 1-10. 
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State Capital Construction-were headed by Yu Qiuli, Kang Shien 
and Gu Mu respectively. 
The return to power of Chen Yun and the rise of Zhao Ziyang 
immediately posed a challenge to the Petroleum Cli~ue's hold of the 
State Council's economic and energy bureaucracies. 9 By 1980, the 
Draft Outline's Capital Construction Program had run into serious 
trouble. The oil rig incident in Bohai Gulf on November 25, 1979, 
became a convenient issue for the attacking of the Petroleum Clique. 
In September 1980 at the third session of the Fifth NPC, Petroleum 
Minister Song Zhenming was fired, Vice Premier Yu Qiuli lost his 
position as Commissioner of the State Planning Commission, and 
Vice Premier Kang Shien was recorded as having received minor 
Party discipline. Minister Tang Ke's alleged mishandling of the 
Baoshan steel complex project encountered serious criticism within 
the high circle. Mayor Li Hujia of Beijing was also under heavy fire 
for bringing in pollution-causing heavy industrial plants to the city. 
He was later removed in early 1981. 
Fundamentally, the debate over the priorities of China's eco-
nomic modernization pitted the group of Zhao, Chen, Yao and Wan 
Li against the Petroleum Clique. The latter is said to have obtained 
Li Xiannian's backing. Li and the Petroleum Clique favored heavy 
industry, capital industry, structural centralization in economic ad-
ministration, and mass mobilization. Chen and Zhao on the other 
hand were committed to market principles, light industry, consumer-
ism, and drastic reform of the rural agricultural policy. But their 
differences went beyond economic policy and structure. There was 
apparent rivalry between these groups in controlling the State Coun-
cil's economic planning machinery. Because Zhao, Chen, Yao and 
Wan Li had been strong political allies of Deng and Hu, they en-
joyed considerable advantage in the rivalry. By 1980-81, the distri-
bution of political power at the Party center had become such that 
the Zhao-Chen group replaced the Petroleum Clique in capturing 
the government economic planning and implementation 
bureaucracies. 
But the policy dispute over economic development has not gen-
erated the same degree of political antagonism as in the two other 
areas of conflict. Yu Qiuli's appointment as Director of the PLA 
Political Department and continuing publicity accrued to Li Xian-
59. Chen Yun's return to power in December 1978 may have contributed considera-
bly to the major shift of economic policy away from emphasis on high accumulation and 
heavy industry, and toward adoption of market mechanisms. See Oksenberg and Bush, 
supra note 13, p. 9. 
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nian's activities in the official media are clear evidence that the Pe-
troleum Clique remains influential in the national politics. 
In short, the group conflicts in PRC's elite politics manifested 
different levels of intensity, as the preceding analyses have indicated. 
There was obvious overlapping of group members; but in each con-
flict arena, at least two principal antagonistic groups can be identi-
fied. Whether these groups existed as factions, cliques, or in some 
other form can be the subject of endless debate. Whether these 
groups have been formed on the basis of one set or another of social, 
cultural, economic, and institutional characteristics is not particu-
larly important in the context of this discussion. Given the fact that 
many group members have reached retirement age, the future of 
Chinese group politics is likely to change. When the principal ad-
versaries are eliminated, what previously appeared to be internal dif-
ferences may suddenly be seen as new factors in the escalation of 
group conflicts. Indeed, as Oksenberg and Bush have indicated, 
"Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and their particular supporters may 
have important differences among themselves."60 In light of this, it 
would be extremely hazardous at this point to predict the likelihood 
of emerging power relationships-for instance, among Hu Yaobang, 
Zhao Ziyang, Yu Qiuli, Li Desheng, Yao Yilin, Yang Shangkun, Xi 
Zhongxun, Yang Dezhi, and Qin Jiwei--once Deng and Chen Yun 
pass away. 
PARTY REBUILDING 
The CCP's party rebuilding began in the early 1970s; it gathered 
momentum soon after the 3rd plenum was over. The guiding princi-
ple was to differentiate the Party from the government in their pur-
suit of structural and functional developments. Hu Yaobang's 
political report at the 12th Party Congress stressed the Party's princi-
pal role in exercising "political and ideological leadership in matters 
of principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, assessment 
and supervision of cadres."61 Five categories of people are excluded 
from leading posts in the Party and government administrative 
structures. They include those rising to prominence by "rebellion;" 
those seriously factionalist in their ideas; those indulging in beating, 
smashing, and looting; those opposing the CC's 3rd plenum line; and 
those seriously violating the law and discipline.62 The implications 
60. Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10. 
61. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 37 (September 13, 1982), p. 35. 
62. Ibid., p. 36. 
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are obvious. Cadres who acquired positions during the "rebellious 
and faction-ridden" period of the Cultural Revolution will be re-
moved. Radicals opposing Deng-Hu's new Party line will be weeded 
out. Those who are suspected of engaging in disruptive and corrupt 
activities will be ousted to ensure party discipline. On the other 
hand, the Party cadre policy emphasizes the recruitment and promo-
tion of those who are revolutionalized (meaning those who have ac-
cepted the Deng-Hu policy lines), who are younger, and who possess 
specialized skills and higher educational level. In short, the policy is 
to rebuild a party with a group of cadres who are professionally 
competent, and devoted to the policy of modernization as inter-
preted by the Deng-Hu leadership. These newly-instituted criteria 
should be regarded as only necessary but not sufficient criteria for 
recruitment and promotion as applied in the Chinese political con-
text. These criteria could at times become the convenient yardsticks 
for eliminating Deng-Hu's political opponents. Older cadres with 
little education or specialized skills and who are suspect because of 
their earlier support of the Gang of Four and the Whateverists will 
be purged under this formula. 
Wholesale change and the reorientation of cadres has invited 
widespread resistance. Many feel threatened by the Party policy, al-
though others are likely to benefit from it. A People's Daily editorial 
noted that only 58.7 percent of the 20 million cadres (including non-
party members) possess a high school level education.63 About 11 
million of them (55 percent) fall under the range of 36-55 years old, 
the principal age category set by the Party for recruiting or retaining 
cadres for the factory, college, county, municipality, and provincial 
levels.64 Insufficient education of the cadres poses a serious problem 
for the PRC's modernization drive. Of the 450,000 leading cadres 
above the level of vice magistrates, 310,000 or 69 percent are under 
55 years old.65 In other words, about 31 percent of the leading cad-
res at this level or above are potential targets for weeding out. In 
general, as much as 45 percent of the second-echelon cadres may be 
targeted for substitution. The overall thrust of current cadre policy 
is the commitment to building more rigorous administrative teams. 
Speaking at the cadres conference on January 16, 1980, Deng Xiaop-
ing emphasized that local, as well as county, leaders in the produc-
tion and service units, including Party secretaries, must be recruited 
63. Renmin Ribao, Editorial, October 29, 1982, p. I. 
64. Song Renqiong, Hongqi, No. 407 (October I, 1983), p. 12. 
65. Renmin Ribao, February 23, 1983, p. I. Figures were given by Song Renqiong at 
the Party Schools Work Conference which was convened on February 22. 
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from the age category between 36 and 44, and possess specialized 
knowledge.66 Those who had graduated from colleges during 1961-
66 fit into this category and were particularly singled out for recruit-
ment because of their ages and education backgrounds. 
The problems associated with the cadres' inadequate back-
ground in education, skill, and age are all too real. The CCP faces 
yet another serious issue related to the Party members' ineptness and 
ideological flux. Of the current 39 million members, 40.6 percent 
reportedly had joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution, 45.4 
percent before 1966, and 14 percent since 1976; and only 15.8 per-
cent of all of them possess at least high school education.67 One 
Western reporter detected a pervasive leftist tendency among Party 
members and cadres, manifested in the form of "obstructive nihilism 
which seeks to avoid responsibility and put up passive resistence to 
the Deng leadership's reformist policies."68 Poor attitude and pas-
sive work style are now targeted for eradication in the Party's current 
rectification campaign, which has intensified since 1980. A more 
worrisome phenomenon is the widespread existence of the "Crisis of 
Three Faiths," meaning the loss of confidence in the Party, Social-
ism, and the Four Modernizations. Many Chinese youth, even the 
students of elite universities who have better career prospects, pro-
fess to have such an attitudinal tendency. A survey of Beijing Uni-
versity students in 1981 found that "crisis of faith" rated the most 
serious of three problems identified by the students.69 Another poll 
conducted at Fudan University, Shanghai, revealed that only thirty 
percent of the respondents retain strong faith in communism or so-
cialism, while 25 percent believe in "nothing at all," a sign of nihil-
ism and alienation, one scholar concludes.70 
Clearly there is no easy answer to these deep-seated problems. 
The Deng-Hu leadership apparently envisions that the success of 
modernization programs as well as of Party-rebuilding and the resto-
ration of the Party powers are primary steps toward their ultimate 
solutions. During the period of 1978-83, this leadership appears to 
66. "Deng Xiaoping Kuanyu muqian xingshi he renwu di baogao," (Report by Deng 
Xiaoping concerning the current situations and tasks) Zheng Ming, No. 29 (March 1980), 
pp. 11-12. . 
67. Renmin Ribao, Editorial, supra note 62. 
68. David Bonavia, "Down but not yet out," FEER (February 14, 1983), p. 22. 
69. Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform Readjustment, Rectification," Asian Survey 
vol. 22, No. I (January, 1982), p. 39. 
70. Alan P. L. Liu, "Political Decay on Mainland China: On Crisis of Faith, Confi-
dence and Trust," Chang King-yuh (ed), The Emerging Teng System, Vol. II, supra note 
23 pp. 3-4. 
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have mapped a strategy of Party-rebuilding that started at the very 
top, and which must gradually filter down to the grassroots. 
The initial effort brought about confrontation between the 
Deng-Hu leadership and the Whateverists in late 1978 over the con-
trol of the Party's bureaucratic center. As discussed earlier in this 
article, this involved the struggle to gain control of the CC General 
Office, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, 
the Central Party School, and the Politburo. By the time the CC's 
5th plenum was held in 1980, this initial phase had practically been 
completed. The Central Secretariat headed by Hu Yaobang was re-
stored, and Hua's principal allies in the Politburo-Wang Dongxing, 
Wu De, Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui-were ousted. Wholesale 
changes of the CC members, First Party Secretaries and Party Com-
mittees of the provinces and municipalities, which began at the 3rd 
plenum, picked up momentum following the 5th plenum. By April 
1983, the work was virtually finished. Progress of personal changes 
appeared to have kept pace with the stages of Deng-Hu's success in 
capturing the Party center. At the 3rd plenum, nine rehabilitated 
cadres were added to the CC roster and twelve more at the 4th ple-
num. Of the 333 original CC members from the 11th Party Con-
gress, only 137 or 33 percent survived in the 12th CC. Changes of 
provincial level First Party Secretaries began in 1979. By the end of 
1980, 25 of the 29 First Secretaries were rehabilitated cadres. From 
November 1982 to April 1983, all provincial secretaries and/or Party 
committees were reorganized.71 Their members were reduced as 
part of a national campaign to trim the office holders. Intelligent-
sia--college professors, engineers, etc.-joined the roster in growing 
numbers. Average ages in the Party committees were approximately 
four to five years younger than before. 
The Party reform is now also pursued through a more broadly 
based rectification campaign. Its concrete programs include estab-
lishing classes for regular job training (pei xun ), rotating study (lun 
xun) on ideology, Party lines, and membership requirements, and 
part-time studies at night through correspondence and radio broad-
cast courses. 72 Practices varied according to provinces and cities. 
Major purposes are to upgrade job skills and overall knowledge, and 
to foster ideological indoctrination of cadres and Party members. In 
October, 1982, a decision was made that henceforth the staff in the 
71. The newly "elected" secretaries and committee members appear to be solidly 
behind the Deng-Hu leadership and their overall policies. See the Pro-PRC Shidai Bao 
(San Francisco), Editorial, May 7, 1983, p. I. 
72. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 43 (October 25, 1982), pp. 5-6. 
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central Party government bureaucracies would be required to un-
dergo 6 months of full-time re-education once every 3 years. All 
cadres in the central staff must achieve a level of educational and 
professional proficiency equivalent to high school graduates. Pro-
vincial Party schools have been restored; provincial Party organiza-
tions also offer a variety of educational and reorientation programs 
to improve the cadres' skills and professional knowledge. 73 The CC 
Organization Department also dispatches teams to investigate Party 
work in the factory, in provincial and municipal units. 74 Ad hoc 
programs in selective locations are set up to offer rotating studies. In 
1980 alone, 32 million Party members reportedly attended the rotat-
ing studies to become familiar with the 3rd plenum lines and the 
draft of proposed Party Constitution.75 Similar programs were re-
peated in 1981. In July-August, 1982, 449,000 Party members or 
68.8 percent of the total within the jurisdiction of Beijing Party or-
ganization participated in such programs.76 The remaining members 
were expected to follow suit in September. The CCP central author-
ities are apparently ready to stage a nationwide membership rectifi-
cation campaign. In the process, a substantial number of Party 
members recruited during the Cultural Revolution are expected to 
be expelled. 
Among all of these training or reorientation programs, those 
run by the Party schools are considered to be most important insofar 
as upgrading the qualifications of cadres are concerned. Such pro-
grams in the Party schools serve a form of what Harry Harding de-
scribes as "re~ularized internal remedialism," aimed at cadre 
indoctrination.7 The Central Party School, shut down in 1966, was 
re-opened in 1977. Within two years, most provincial Party schools 
were restored. 
The Central Party School is run by Wang Zhen (President), 
Jiang Nanxiang (First Vice-President) and Feng Wenpin (Vice-
President). All three have close ties with the Deng-Hu leadership. 
From 1977 to 1982, 17,883 cadres attended the Party school pro-
73. In Shanxi, for instance, such schools graduated 4,259 cadres last year and are 
currently enrolling 3,130. See Renmin Ribao, April 4, 1983, p. I. David Bonavia re-
ported that in early 1983 there were more than 2000 such schools in the nation. See 
"Down but not yet out," supra note 68, p. 24. 
74. Recently the department dispatched two teams to 14 provinces and cities, studied 
72 enterprise units, and engaged in broad discussions with over 100 cadres who have 
specialized skills. See Renmin Ribao, March 30, 1983, p. I. 
75. Renmin Ribao, November 29, 1982, p. I. 
76. Renmin Ribao, September 2, 1982, p. 5. 
77. Harding, Organizing China, supra note 5, p. 331. 
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grams.78 In Fall 1982, 1,300 cadres enrolled in the main campus of 
the school while an additional 3,600 central cadres studied in two 
branch campuses.79 The school offers rotating studies and classes for 
studying communist theories.80 
The rotating studies class offers a two year curriculum for lead-
ing cadres in provincial and prefecture governments. Entrance ex-
aminations are required, but applicants must possess college degrees 
and high school diplomas respectively. Both must have five years' 
work experience. Age limits are 45 for the provincial cadres and 40 
for those from the prefecture. They study Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought (55 percent of study time), science, and specialized 
subjects. 
The theory class is designed to turn out teachers for provincial 
Party schools and to train career Party ideologists in managing the 
propaganda organs above the county level. This is also a two-year 
curriculum. Possession of a college degree or an equivalent educa-
tional level plus three years of work experience is required for eligi-
bility for the entrance examinations. The age limit is 35. In addition 
to the Central Party School, there are over 8,100 Party and other 
schools. 81 During 1979-81, over 200,000 leading cadres at county 
level and above had received a variety of training through rotating 
studies. 82 Hu Y aobang had said that a pervasive rectification aimed 
at the Party rank-and-file members will commence in the second half 
of 1983. In six years after the Party's rebuilding efforts began, the 
CCP has evidently recovered from its pre-1958 form. Without a 
doubt, the Party once again asserts itself as the true locus of political 
powers in the PRC regime. 
THE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 
From the preceeding analyses, the power transfer in the post-
Mao era has evidently moved from the hands of Hua Guofeng, Y e 
Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and Li Xiannian to those ofDeng Xiaop-
ing, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun, and was virtually 
complete by the 12th Party Congress. This process took about four 
years, from approximately mid-1978 to September 1982. Members 
of the power elite closely identified with the later years of Mao and 
78. Renmin Ribao, August 25, 1982, p. I. 
79. Renmin Ribao, September 5, 1982, p. I. The figures were given by Wang Zhen in 
his speech delivered in the Central Party School. 
80. Renmin Ribao, February 19, 1982, p. I. 
81. Song Renqiong, Hongqi, supra note 63, p. 14. 
82. Ibid. 
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Maoism were discredited, and many were eliminated from active 
political life. Maoist ideological line, policies and institutions have 
been mostly modified or discarded. The value of Mao Zedong as a 
revolutionary charismatic leader in legitimizing the regime's authori-
ties has lost his validity. The transformation of China has clearly 
entered the post-mobilization phase. As one examines the new di-
rections of policy and institutional developments, one is struck by 
the extent to which the PRC's political system has been undergoing 
rapid change. 
The following statements are conclusions based on the informa-
tion utilized in this study. 
1. Re-establishing institutionalized one-party rule: The CCP 
Party organization has been rebuilt. The process of reestablishing 
institutional hierarchies, norms and procedures had mostly been 
achieved by 1982. The Party center is now controlled by the rehabil-
itated senior cadres associated with the Deng-Hu group. Radical 
Hua and his close associates also have been edged out. Younger and 
better educated cadres with functional skills are also on the rise, par-
ticularly at the levels of provincial, municipal and county Party or-
gans. Party powers become once again the dominant factor in the 
PRC's political process. 83 Power elites at the top form a functional 
system whereby each key leader in the Politburo and the Central 
Secretariat is given a functional area of responsibility. In spite of 
Deng's overall dominant position, collective leadership has been 
adopted as operational rule. Conscious efforts are made to separate 
the Party from government-in structure, function and personnel. 
Available evidence, however, points to continuing fusion of mem-
bership and authorities between the two institutional spheres with 
the Party in commanding position. The assertion of powers by the 
CCP over other institutional domains is in fact growing. 
2. In the wake of growing Party power and the stress on build-
ing a modern, professionalized military, the PLA's political power 
has been severely curtailed. PLA top brass who refuse to accept the 
new political order are removed. Members of the old guard lacking 
knowledge, skill, and interest in modernizing the armed forces are 
being pensioned off. Military representation in the Party-the 
Politburo, the Central Committee, and provincial Party organs-has 
been scaled down considerably. Using the five Field Army systems 
83. Oksenberg and Bush's study also conclude that the Party "would retain its mo-
nopoly of power and be revitalized in order to perform well its distinctive role". See 
Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10. 
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or Military Regions for the purpose of establishing the PLA leader's 
power bases may be a thing of the past. If the current trend persists, 
military intervention in the PRC politics may be gradually coming to 
an end. 
3. The current party policy in stressing education, skill and 
over-all professional competence as criteria for promotion and re-
cruitment could give rise to a "dual executive" system in administra-
tion and management.84 This would direct China's leadership style 
toward the Soviet model. Increasingly, cadres must be both "red" 
and "expert". 
4. Formation of political groups, as evident since the mid-
1970s, involve a multiplicity of factors. Group conflicts cut across 
power, ideological, and policy considerations. As far as the post-3rd 
plenum period is concerned, the most salient characteristics in group 
politics have been the struggles between the victims and beneficiaries 
of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the conflict process entails 
a strong character of revenge politics. To be sure, within the Dengist 
grand coalition, there exists a variety of policy oriented groups. For 
the moment the stakes for their continuing unity remain high. Thus 
internal dissension may assert itself only if Deng passes away in the 
near future. 
5. In the PRC political system, ideology-Maoist ideology in 
particular-as the basis for the regime's legitimacy has severely 
eroded.85 The dictum of "Seek Truths and Facts" contributes im-
mensely toward the process of ideological erosion. Such erosion in-
teracts broadly with the evidently popular outcry over the "Crisis of 
Three Faiths." Even students of the elite universities, such as Beida 
and Fudan, whose career prospects actually seem more promising 
than most others under the current recruitment policy have ex-
pressed the same sentiments. The PRC's legitimacy, if indeed that 
needs to be justified, would probably depend more on the progress of 
the Four Modernizations. Democratic elections and permission for 
more spontaneous group activity would help; but at this stage of 
China's political development, such expectations are premature. In 
view of the evolving overall political characteristics, the PRC system 
84. George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, New York: Atherton 
Press, 1968, pp. 47-91. 
85. Richard Lowenthal argues that "most regimes created by revolutional violence 
acquire effective legitimacy, ... simply through passage of time; people grow up with 
them and come to regard them as normal." See his "The Ruling Party in a Mature 
Society," in Mark G. Field, ed., Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist So-
cieties, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 101. 
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would probably fit well in H. Gordon Skilling's description of a 
Consultative Authoritarianism, whereby the Party leadership mono-
polizes decisions and refuses to tolerate any spontaneous group 
activity. 86 
6. This study does not focus its analyses on the state institu-
tional development. It should be pointed out, however, that institu-
tional developments during the 1978-82 period also extended to the 
reform of state structures and personnel policy. Research results 
elsewhere and in the PRC's official reports indicate a continuing pro-
cess of retrenchment in the government bureaucracy. By 1982 such a 
process appeared to be completed at the central government level. 
One writer recently suggested that the reformist objectives are to 
achieve structural differentiation and institutionalization in order to 
make governance more effective_B? Such institutional reforms have 
been initiated at the provincial and local government levels, but the 
overall process may be more time-consuming. By the end of 1982, 
for instance, only 69 of the nation's 2,000 counties and cities have 
established separate township governments in replacing the existing 
commune collective structures. 88 The decision to reform the rural 
communes had been adopted four years earlier. Resistance to such 
institutional changes are evidently strong and widespread. Nonethe-
less, under the current leadership and policy direction, significant 
changes in institution will most likely continue. 
86. H. Gordon Skilling classifies single-party authoritarian systems into five types: 
quasi-totalitarianism, consultative authoritarianism, quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism, 
democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism, and anarchic authoritarianism (China 
during the Cultural Revolution). See his "Group Conflict and Political Change" in 
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